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THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Janet Moore *  
Abstract: Criminal procedure experts often claim that poor people have no Sixth 
Amendment right to choose their criminal defense lawyers. These experts insist that the 
Supreme Court has reserved the Sixth Amendment right to choose for the small minority of 
defendants who can afford to hire counsel. This Article upends that conventional wisdom 
with new doctrinal, theoretical, and practical arguments supporting a Sixth Amendment right 
to choose for all defendants, including the overwhelming majority who are indigent. The 
Article’s fresh case analysis shows the Supreme Court’s “no-choice” statements are dicta, 
which the Court’s own reasoning and rulings refute. The Article’s new theoretical framework 
exposes the “no-choice” stance as an antidemocratic concentration of judicial power, which 
blocks pressure from poor people to strengthen the right to counsel. Finally, the Article 
addresses practical objections to an equal right of attorney choice with innovative strategies 
that promote meaningful choice for all defendants.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Criminal procedure experts often claim that poor people have no 
Sixth Amendment right to choose their criminal defense lawyers.1 These 
experts insist that the Supreme Court has reserved the Sixth Amendment 
right to choose counsel for the small minority of defendants who can 
afford to hire their lawyers.2 The Court itself has made the same claim.3 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION AND RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 277–86 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to choose for those who “can 
afford an attorney” or recruit pro bono help (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006) and Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983))); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1478 (10th ed. 2014) (“The Supreme 
Court has held that so long as an indigent receives effective representation, he has no right to choose 
a particular counsel” (citing Slappy, 461 U.S. 1)); see also YALE KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 121 (13th ed. 2012) (“[A] defendant 
may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford . . . . “ (citing Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 202 (1988))). 
2. See, e.g., SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 1. 
3. See, e.g., Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (“[A]n indigent 
defendant, while entitled to adequate representation, has no right to have the Government pay for 
his preferred representational choice” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (“We have previously held that an element of this right is the right of a 
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” (emphasis 
added) (internal citation omitted)). But see infra section II.A (showing that the Supreme Court’s 
anti-choice statements are dicta). The Court also has indicated that defendants who can recruit pro 
bono counsel may have a Sixth Amendment right to choose. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144. This 
Article focuses on disparate application of the Sixth Amendment right to choose based on ability to 
hire counsel because recruitment of pro bono counsel is relatively rare. See, e.g., Douglas A. 
Berman, Professor Mark Osler’s Informed Perspective on Recent Federal Clemency Developments, 
SENTENCING L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 4, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_ 
 
11 - Moore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  1:04 PM 
2016] THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT 1707 
 
This Article shows that those claims are mistaken and offers new 
arguments supporting a Sixth Amendment right to choose for all 
defendants—including the overwhelming majority who are indigent4 
and who are disproportionately people of color.5 
These new arguments answer a blunt question that Chief Justice John 
Roberts asked during oral argument on the Sixth Amendment right to 
choose. On hearing that indigent defendants have no right to choose their 
lawyers, the Chief Justice asked, “Why not?”6 The correct answer is that 
there is no good reason to discriminate against poor people in the 
vindication of this fundamental constitutional right. To the contrary, 
such de jure discrimination is antidemocratic. It concentrates judicial 
power and blocks pressure from poor people to improve the quality, 
fairness, and legitimacy of criminal legal systems as well as the content 
of constitutional law. 
Chief Justice Roberts did not receive that answer during oral 
argument because the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel is 
understudied by scholars, undertheorized by courts, and underutilized by 
advocates of criminal justice reform. This Article fills the gap with new 
doctrinal, theoretical, and practical analysis that shows why it is 
important to include poor people in the right to choose counsel. 
The argument unfolds as follows. Since the Sixth Amendment right to 
choose is understudied and undertheorized, Part I explains how judges 
discriminate against poor people in vindicating the right to choose 
counsel and how this de jure discrimination is antidemocratic. This Part 
applies the author’s democracy-enhancing framework for criminal law 
and procedure,7 which moves beyond dominant justifications for 
                                                     
law_and_policy/2015/06/professor-mark-oslers-informed-perspective-on-recent-federal-clemency-
developments.html [http://perma.cc/6N5H-CJFQ]. 
4. See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov/index. 
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772 [http://perma.cc/54XC-TNMS] (estimating that eighty-two percent of 
criminal defendants facing felony charges cannot afford to hire counsel). 
5. See KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 
2014 1–2 (2015) (defining poverty metrics); id. at 5, tbl.2 (documenting disproportionate poverty 
rates for Black and Hispanic populations). 
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (No. 
05-352). 
7. See Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. 
REV. 543, 563–72; cf. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1893 (2014) (reframing federalism in terms of promoting “a well-functioning 
national democracy”). 
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criminal law (utilitarian-retributive),8 for criminal procedure (due 
process-crime control),9 and for the right to choose counsel (libertarian-
free market).10 The democracy-enhancing approach focuses on whether 
and how criminal legal policies reduce reliance on incarceration by 
promoting equal capacities for individual and communal self-
governance.11 This mode of analysis focuses particularly on the 
capacities of poor people and people of color who have 
disproportionately high contact with crime and criminal legal systems, 
but little voice in generating and administering the governing law.12 
This new democracy-enhancing framework exposes the “no-choice” 
stance as one that denigrates the agency and silences the individual and 
collective voices of poor people and people of color. Conversely, this 
framework reveals the right to choose counsel as a mode of grassroots 
lawmaking that frees the overwhelming majority of defendants to press 
for improvements in the governing law. This transformation can occur as 
more defendants demand better information about key performance 
indicators for quality defense service. Those indicators include 
independence from funders and judges, resource parity with the 
prosecution, and enforcement of best-practice standards for attorney 
qualification, workload and performance.13 
Transparency begets accountability.14 More defendants making more 
informed choices raises pressure to improve prevailing standards for 
attorney performance. Significantly, those same standards define the 
substantive meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under 
                                                     
8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14–23 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing 
distinction between retributivism’s focus on moral desert, and utilitarianism’s focus on promoting 
social benefits and reducing social costs).  
9. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–74 (1968) (discussing 
distinction between the due process focus on fairness and the crime-control focus on harm 
reduction). 
10. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: 
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All 
Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 109–10 (1993) (combining libertarian focus on 
individual autonomy with free-market analysis). 
11. See Moore, supra note 7. 
12. See id. at 545–63; Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2174, 2185–89 (2014).  
13. See infra Part I. 
14. At least under conditions posited here. See Jonathan Fox, The Uncertain Relationship 
Between Transparency and Accountability, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 663, 667–69 (2007). I thank Jennifer 
Laurin for insights on the application of these concepts in the context of public defense reform. See 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Data and Accountability in Indigent Defense, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
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Strickland v. Washington.15 Strickland’s laissez-faire approach to 
attorney performance has kept prevailing attorney performance 
standards low.16 By pressing to improve those standards, poor people 
and people of color can contribute, collectively and over time, to 
strengthening the substantive meaning of this fundamental constitutional 
right.17 
Thus, the new democracy-enhancing framework for the Sixth 
Amendment right to choose has significant practical implications. Yet 
the Sixth Amendment right to choose has been underutilized by criminal 
justice reform advocates. Therefore, this Article offers additional support 
for an inclusive right to choose that benefits all defendants. Parts II and 
III offer new doctrinal analysis that supports the indigent defendant’s 
right to choose counsel. Part II shows that the Supreme Court’s 
discriminatory “no-choice-for-the-poor” statements are dicta, which the 
Court’s own rulings and reasoning refute. Part III uncovers new tension 
over the “no-choice” rule in state courts and lower federal courts, which 
litigators and policy advocates can exploit. 
Part IV supplements these doctrinal discoveries with practical 
strategies to make an inclusive right of counsel choice meaningful. 
These strategies include client-rights and client-feedback protocols as 
well as community organizing techniques that can reduce the opacity of 
the legal market and promote more informed attorney choice. This 
Article concludes that reform advocates should use these new doctrinal, 
theoretical, and practical arguments to replace “no-choice” 
discrimination with an inclusive right of counsel choice that applies 
equally to all defendants. 
I. THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Part I lays a foundation for the doctrinal and practical analysis that 
follows. Section I.A explains how judges discriminate against poor 
people in vindicating the right to choose counsel. Sections I.B–D explain 
how this de jure discrimination is antidemocratic—that is, how it 
concentrates judicial power and blocks pressure by poor people to 
strengthen the right to counsel. Section I.E explains how these problems 
undermine system legitimacy. 
                                                     
15. 466 U.S. 664, 687 (1984); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010). 
16. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
17. Cf. Cecelia Klingele, Editor’s Observations: Vindicating the Right to Counsel, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 87, 90 & nn.32–33 (2012) (discussing how line attorneys can reshape meaning of 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
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A. The Double Standard 
This section explains how judges discriminate against poor people in 
vindicating the right to choose counsel. The analysis begins with the 
constitutional text. The Sixth Amendment secures a criminal defendant 
“the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”18 The 
Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is a “fundamental” 
constitutional guarantee19 because it is “necessary to insure . . . life and 
liberty.”20 Therefore, the Court has held, a defendant cannot be 
incarcerated for any conviction unless he or she either receives the 
assistance of counsel or waives the right to a lawyer.21 This fundamental 
right applies to the minority of defendants who can hire lawyers as well 
as to the majority who need government-paid counsel because they 
cannot afford an attorney.22 
The minority of defendants who can afford to hire counsel have a 
Sixth Amendment right to hire any lawyer who is willing to take the 
case.23 However, the right to hire counsel of choice is subject to several 
important limitations. Those limitations include forfeiture laws, which 
empower governments to seize resources that can be traced to criminal 
activity and that defendants would otherwise use to pay their chosen 
counsel.24 
Another important limitation on the right to hire counsel of choice is 
the ability of trial judges to override that choice.25 Several circumstances 
can justify such overrides.26 Trial judges may deem a chosen lawyer to 
be unqualified to handle the case, unavailable to proceed in a timely 
manner without disrupting the court’s docket, or unable to cure a conflict 
                                                     
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
19. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986). 
20. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). 
21. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658−59 (2002) (right applies to any case involving 
incarceration, including misdemeanors resulting in subsequently revoked probation); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339−41, 345 (1963) (right incorporated against the states in felony cases 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467−68 (absent a 
knowing and voluntary waiver, “failure to complete the court” by providing counsel for indigent 
defendants violates the Sixth Amendment and divests federal courts of jurisdiction). 
22. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345; HARLOW, supra note 4. 
23. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). 
24. See infra section II.A.3. 
25. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151–52. 
26. Id. 
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of interest.27 Thus, the right to hire counsel of choice is confined to 
lawyers who are qualified, available, and conflict-free.28 
If a trial judge deems a defendant’s chosen lawyer to be unqualified, 
unavailable, or conflicted, the judge can require the defendant to proceed 
with alternate counsel. If the defendant is required to proceed with 
alternate counsel and the case ends in a conviction, the defendant may 
raise the counsel-choice issue on appeal as a basis for obtaining a new 
trial.29 To prevail on that claim, the defendant must prove that the trial 
court abused its discretion in overriding the defendant’s choice of hired 
counsel.30 
The abuse-of-discretion standard is difficult to meet. The standard 
requires deference to a trial judge’s assessment of fact-intensive 
matters,31 such as whether a particular lawyer is sufficiently qualified, 
available, and conflict-free to handle a particular case. That deference is 
based on the trial judge’s superior “feel of the case[,] which no 
appellate . . . transcript can impart.”32 
These substantive and procedural limitations on the Sixth Amendment 
right of counsel choice are significant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has defined the right to choose an attorney as the “root meaning” of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.33 The Court excavated that “root 
meaning” in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.34 The case is noteworthy 
for several reasons. 
First, the prosecution conceded in Gonzalez-Lopez that the judge 
erred in overriding the defendant’s choice of counsel.35 In other words, 
the prosecution conceded that the defendant’s chosen lawyer should 
have been allowed to represent the defendant at trial because that lawyer 
was qualified, available, and free from conflicts of interest.36 That 
concession lifted a heavy burden of proof from the defendant’s 
shoulders. 
                                                     
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id.  
30. Id. at 152. 
31. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 759–61 (1982). 
32.  Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947) (quoted in Friendly, 
supra note 31, at 761.  
33. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–49. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 152. 
36. See id. 
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Because the prosecution conceded that the trial judge violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel, the only issue in 
Gonzalez-Lopez was the standard of review that appellate courts should 
use to evaluate such an error.37 Typically, prosecutors must prove that 
constitutional errors are harmless—that is, that the errors did not affect 
the outcome of the trial—in order to win a case on appeal.38 In 
Gonzalez-Lopez, however, Justice Scalia authored a 5-4 majority opinion 
that rejected harmless-error review.39 Instead, the Court held that denial 
of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel is 
structural error.40 
Application of the structural error standard to the right of counsel 
choice is significant because, under that standard, appellate courts may 
not ask whether a trial judge’s override of counsel choice affected the 
case outcome.41 Regardless of the strength of the case, or how well the 
trial lawyer performed, reversal is automatic and the conviction must be 
vacated.42 
It is also important to note that structural error is the most appellant-
friendly standard of review and applies only to a tiny set of 
constitutional claims.43 Such claims encompass violations of the right to 
an indictment by a grand jury selected without racial bias,44 the rights to 
an impartial judge45 and a public trial,46 and the right to accurate jury 
instructions on reasonable doubt.47 Violations of these rights are of 
“the rare type” that “infect the entire trial process . . . and necessarily 
render [it] fundamentally unfair.”48 
Gonzalez-Lopez is therefore noteworthy because the case ushered the 
Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel into an elite pantheon of 
constitutional errors that are structural and require automatic reversal. 
Equally significant, however, are the Court’s statements that poor people 
                                                     
37. See id. at 148. 
38. See Glebe v. Frost, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014). 
39. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142, 150, 152. 
40. Id. at 150–51. 
41. See id. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 146–48, 149 n.4. 
44. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1986). 
45. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010). 
46. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984). 
47. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
48. Glebe v. Frost, __ U.S. __ ,135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
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have “no right to choose” their criminal defense lawyers,49 and therefore 
cannot benefit from the same generous standard of review enjoyed by 
defendants who can afford to hire counsel. The Court’s “no-choice-for-
the-poor” statements are dicta,50 but lower courts and commentators 
misconstrue them as settled law.51 
When lower courts apply the “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance as 
settled law, trial judges have final authority to appoint defense lawyers 
for poor people who face criminal charges.52 Even if an indigent 
defendant finds a lawyer who is qualified, available, and free from 
conflicts of interest—in other words, if the indigent defendant satisfies 
the same criteria for vindicating the right to choose counsel that apply to 
defendants who can hire counsel—the indigent defendant nevertheless 
has no Sixth Amendment right to choose that lawyer.53 
Instead, the indigent defendant must prove to the trial judge that there 
is an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown of communication with 
the court-appointed lawyer, which will prevent that lawyer from 
presenting an adequate defense.54 Nor will appellate courts reverse a 
subsequent conviction for structural error if they determine that the trial 
judge wrongly forced the indigent defendant to proceed with the 
unwanted lawyer.55 Instead, the indigent defendant must meet a far more 
onerous test, which the Supreme Court established in Strickland v. 
Washington.56 
Understanding the antidemocratic effects of this de jure double 
standard requires a brief explanation of Strickland and how that case 
defines the substantive meaning of the right to counsel. Section I.B 
provides that explanation. 
                                                     
49. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 784 (2009) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). 
50. See infra section II.A. 
51. See supra note 1; infra Part III. 
52. See infra section I.C. 
53. See infra Part III. State and lower federal courts have applied the “no-choice” constitutional 
rule to trump counsel choice by indigent defendants even when local rules or statutes allow 
defendants to substitute counsel. See, e.g, United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(distinguishing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c), which grants judicial discretion to approve requests for 
substitute counsel “in the interests of justice”); State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 391–92, 392 n.17 
(Wis. 2010) (applying similar reasoning to WIS. ADMIN. CODE PD § 2.04 (2016)). 
54. See Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 390–91. 
55. Id. at 394–95. 
56. Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)); see Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
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B. Strickland and the Meaning of the Right to Counsel 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Court established a two-part 
definition of what it means “to have the Assistance of Counsel.”57 To 
overturn a conviction or sentence under Strickland, a defendant must 
prove two things. First, the defendant must prove that his or her lawyer 
acted unreasonably in light of prevailing attorney performance 
standards.58 Second, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility 
that this substandard performance hurt the defendant’s case.59 
Significantly, the first prong of the Strickland test bakes real-world 
attorney practices into the substantive definition of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.60 Those real-world practices include 
promulgation of formal guidelines for attorney performance, which 
address core duties to communicate, investigate, and advocate.61 Courts 
often use those guidelines to assess the reasonableness of a lawyer’s 
performance when a defendant claims that the lawyer’s constitutional 
ineffectiveness requires a new trial or sentencing hearing.62 
Unfortunately, the gap between formal attorney performance 
guidelines and real-world practice is immense.63 Strickland’s 
performance-and-prejudice test is maligned for giving free passes to 
drunk, sleeping, lazy, and overworked lawyers.64 Less a constitutional 
floor than a leaky, sewage-filled basement, the first prong of the test 
requires strong judicial deference to possible (and sometimes fanciful) 
strategic reasons for challenged attorney conduct.65 Examples include 
                                                     
57. 466 U.S. at 685 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI); id. at 687 (setting standard). 
58. Id. at 687. 
59. Id. 
60. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010). 
61. See id. at 367 (citing examples). 
62. Id. 
63. See generally NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NGS-3EPM] [hereinafter JUSTICE 
DENIED] (urging reform); see also Gary Feldon & Tara Beech, Unpacking the First Prong of the 
Strickland Standard: How to Identify Controlling Precedent and Determine Prevailing Professional 
Norms in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15–24 (2012) 
(proposing method for identifying prevailing professional norms). 
64. See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense 
and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (2015). 
65. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see, e.g., Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. 
Supp. 2d 706, 728−30 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per curiam, 467 F. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding trial counsel ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying 
defendant new trial). The author represented Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal 
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the “strategic” decision not to investigate and present evidence of actual 
innocence in the guilt/innocence phase of a capital case.66 
Thus, defendants have an extremely difficult burden in attempting to 
satisfy Strickland. An abundant literature documents the costs of that 
burden, including an ongoing crisis of overloaded, underfunded, low-
quality public defense service.67 That scholarship is not re-canvassed 
here. There is wide agreement, however, that Strickland contributes to 
the indigent defense crisis with abysmally low constitutional standards 
for defense attorney performance.68 
But Strickland has a narrow escape hatch—at least for certain 
defendants who have the means to hire counsel. As discussed above, for 
those defendants, violation of their right to choose a specific lawyer 
requires structural error review.69 Appellate courts may not inquire into 
the quality of substitute counsel’s performance or whether it hurt the 
defendant’s case.70 Reversal is automatic.71 The Strickland escape hatch 
is therefore a significant procedural benefit, which the “no-choice-for-
the-poor” stance restricts to the minority of defendants who can hire 
counsel. 
Blocking poor people from Strickland’s escape hatch is perverse for 
several reasons. De jure discrimination in the vindication of a 
fundamental constitutional right violates equal protection and due 
process guarantees.72 That discrimination also makes the Sixth 
Amendment antidemocratic. 
Those antidemocratic effects are manifest in three ways. First, the 
discriminatory “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance blocks pressure from 
poor people and people of color to strengthen the right to counsel. 
Second, that stance concentrates unchecked judicial power. Finally, that 
stance undermines the legitimacy of criminal legal systems. Each of 
these problems is explained more fully below. For current purposes, it is 
important to summarize how abolishing that discrimination can increase 
                                                     
appellate and post-conviction challenges to his convictions and death sentence. Scanlon, 740 F. 
Supp. 2d at 708. 
66. Scanlon, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 728−30. 
67. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63. 
68. See, e.g., id. at 38–43, 212–13 (urging reform). 
69. See supra section I.A (discussing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150−51 
(2006)).  
70. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150–51. 
71. Id. 
72. See infra section II.B. 
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pressure to improve both attorney performance and the substantive 
meaning of the right to counsel. 
Extending the right of counsel choice to poor people encourages more 
defendants to demand information about attorney performance, to use 
that information to choose better-performing lawyers, and, through the 
collective influence of those choices, to pressure more lawyers to 
provide better performance. Since Strickland bakes real-world 
performance standards into the substantive definition of the right to 
counsel, improving those performance standards should gradually 
strengthen the meaning of the right. 
History demonstrates that such pressure can be effective. Past 
improvements in real-world performance standards have trickled up to 
redefine and strengthen the right to counsel under Strickland. Those 
improvements, and the resulting substantive redefinition of “assistance 
of counsel,” were driven primarily by elites, however, and not by 
indigent defendants. Wiggins v. Smith73 is a leading example. In that 
case, pressure to improve standards of performance came from a 
changing zeitgeist among leaders in the capital defense bar.74 
Wiggins raised the question whether capital defense lawyers met 
Strickland’s substantive definition of “assistance” of counsel. To answer 
that question, the Court followed Strickland and compared counsel’s 
performance with local and national standards for capital defense 
representation.75 The Court concluded that the decision to truncate a 
mitigation investigation in a capital case must itself be informed by an 
objectively reasonable investigation.76 In other words, capital defense 
lawyers cannot make objectively reasonable decisions about evidence 
they never bother to investigate.77 The Court concluded that counsel had 
failed to meet that standard, and vacated the death sentence.78 
The Court decided Wiggins amidst a “cataclysmic” shift in 
performance standards for capital defense.79 Those standards were 
moving from an “unwise and unsound and . . . increasingly obsolete” 
focus on obtaining acquittals in the guilt/innocence phase to a new norm 
                                                     
73. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
74. David R. Dow, Bell v. Cone: The Fatal Consequences of Incomplete Failure, in DEATH 
PENALTY STORIES 395 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009). 
75. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25, 534. 
76. Id.  
77. See id. 
78. Id. at 538. 
79. See Dow, supra note 74, at 395. 
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under which “mitigation [is] a mainstay.”80 Wiggins therefore 
demonstrates that the substantive meaning of the right to counsel can 
change over time as the Court incorporates improvements in prevailing 
attorney performance standards into the two-part Strickland test.81 
Wiggins also illustrates how change in the substantive meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment right to “assistance of counsel” occurs dialogically. 
As reformed practice standards elevate the constitutional floor, new 
training programs are designed and implemented to bring more 
practitioners up to that new performance level.82 Unfortunately, Wiggins 
also demonstrates the rate of that change has been excruciatingly slow 
and its scope minimal. Indeed, it should shock the uninitiated reader to 
realize that a Supreme Court ruling was necessary to establish the 
constitutional duty of capital defense counsel to investigate readily-
available evidence that could save a client’s life. It should be equally 
concerning that the Court established the constitutional duty to 
investigate mitigation evidence nearly twenty years before Wiggins was 
decided—in Strickland v. Washington.83 
The pace of this constitutional change could quicken, and its limited 
scope could expand, if courts stop discriminating against the 
overwhelming majority of defendants who are indigent with respect to 
the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. Moreover, excluding that 
majority from the right of counsel choice concentrates virtually 
unreviewable power in the judiciary. Understanding these 
antidemocratic aspects of the “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance requires a 
more thorough explanation of existing mechanisms for connecting 
indigent defendants with lawyers. Section I.C provides that explanation. 
C. The Problem of Judicial Appointments 
Judges have final responsibility for appointing lawyers to represent 
indigent defendants.84 They fulfill that responsibility by drawing from a 
                                                     
80. Id.  
81. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010), marked a similar seismic shift in the 
substantive meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Strickland by requiring defense 
attorneys to inform clients of deportation consequences connected to plea offers. 
82. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 316 (2011). 
83. 466 U.S. 664, 675–76, 691, 699 (1984). 
84. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? 
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 191–93 (2012) 
(discussing process in Philadelphia). 
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list or pool of available attorneys.85 Those attorneys may work in public 
defender offices or in private practice.86 Defense lawyers in private 
practice may accept indigent clients on a case-by-case basis or take 
batches of cases under flat-fee contracts.87 When judges appoint lawyers 
in any of these categories, they may exercise discretion based on the 
same concerns about attorney qualification, availability, and conflicts of 
interest that limit a defendant’s choice of retained counsel.88 
Thus, regardless of the particular mix of service providers in a given 
jurisdiction, by necessity criminal legal systems across the country have 
preexisting infrastructures for identifying lawyers who are available to 
take criminal cases. As discussed more fully below, those infrastructures 
can be adapted to accommodate counsel choice by indigent defendants.89 
Indeed, longstanding experience in England and other countries 
demonstrate that administrability is a relatively minor hurdle to 
implementing an inclusive right of counsel choice that applies equally to 
all defendants.90 A recent experiment with counsel choice for indigents 
in Texas tends to corroborate that point.91 The program is ongoing as 
social scientists evaluate the results of initial implementation, which was 
recently completed with support from a state grant and revealed that “a 
substantial majority of defendants . . . preferred to select their own 
lawyers rather than have the court appoint lawyers for them.”92 
These facts are important because the judicial appointment of counsel 
for indigent defendants raises a number of problems. For one thing, the 
“no-choice-for-the-poor” stance gives judges virtually unreviewable 
                                                     
85. See id. 
86. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82–84. 
87. See id. 
88. See, e.g., Rachel Dissell, Conflicts and ‘Candy Lists’: Debates Continue Between County 
Judges, Defense Attorneys and Prosecutor Over Indigent Case Assignments, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER (Dec. 14, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/index.ssf/2014/12/ 
conflicts_and_candy_lists_deba.html [http://perma.cc/KA54-3RPD] (discussing factors affecting 
judicial appointments). 
89. See infra Part IV. 
90. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need 
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 873 (2004). 
91. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and 
Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 544–56 (2015); Email from Norman Lefstein, Dean 
Emeritus and Professor, Indiana University—Robert H. McKinney School of Law, to Janet Moore, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law (Nov. 19, 2016, 6:33 PM) (on 
file with author) (describing project as “successfully implemented”). 
92. Email from Norman Lefstein, supra note 91; see also Email from Jim Bethke, Executive 
Director, Texas Indigent Defense Commission, to Janet Moore, Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Oct. 26, 2016, 10:14 AM) (on file with author). 
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authority in making defendant-lawyer matches. Concerns about such 
unchecked judicial power are embodied in the American Bar 
Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System.93 
The Ten Principles have been described as “essential” for evaluating 
the effectiveness of indigent defense systems.94 The first of these 
essential principals is political independence of the defense function.95 
Independence promotes zealous advocacy by raising a firewall between 
the funding authority and the lawyer.96 That firewall protects lawyers 
from inevitable pressure to please (or avoid irritating) people with 
ultimate power over their paychecks.97 Thus, the first of the Ten 
Principles requires severing the link between judges and attorney 
appointments.98 
This requirement is mediated in some jurisdictions when judges 
appoint the local public defender who then assigns a staff attorney or 
private lawyer to take the case.99 Other jurisdictions keep the 
appointment authority inside the courthouse, but strive for greater 
neutrality by distributing appointments randomly through a court 
administrator.100 
Unfortunately, appointment processes in too many jurisdictions lack 
oversight and accountability.101 Moreover, judges retain authority to 
trump counsel assignments made by a local public defender or court 
administrator based on their own independent assessments of counsel’s 
qualifications, availability, or potential conflict of interest.102 In addition, 
some appointment processes are tainted by pay-to-play conflicts and 
low-bid contracts, in which judges distribute cases in exchange for 
                                                     
93. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A 
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1–2 (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3CJQ-KTCW] [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES]. 
94. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at the American 
Bar Association’s National Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-american-bar-association-s-
national-summit-indigent [http://perma.cc/3SMH-Q255] [hereinafter Holder, Keynote Address] 
(discussing the importance of the Ten Principles). 
95. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 2. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See Dissell, supra note 88. 
100. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82 (discussing random assignment procedures available 
in Texas). 
101. See id. at 82–84. 
102. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1983). 
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campaign contributions or other concessions from defense lawyers.103 
Such quid pro quo arrangements pressure lawyers to dial back their 
advocacy toward “meet-’em-and-plead-’em” case processing104 as part 
of the local “courtroom work group” culture.105 As the Texas State Bar 
reported, 
Unlike prosecutors, court-appointed defense attorneys have no 
easy access to investigators, experts, or witnesses. In many 
cases, they are not given enough time or money to do a good 
job. Many court-appointed lawyers feel pressured to back off 
from aggressively representing their clients out of fear that their 
efforts will go unpaid or that they will be removed from the list 
of attorneys doing such cases.106 
Such tainted decision making results when concentrated power 
operates without transparency and accountability. Courts concentrate 
their own power, and reduce transparency and accountability, by 
excluding poor people from exercising the same Sixth Amendment right 
to attorney choice that is enjoyed by defendants who have the means to 
hire counsel. Viewing attorney choice as a democracy-enhancing 
mechanism reveals its potential to check that concentrated power and to 
operate as a form of grassroots lawmaking. Section I.D explains the 
latter potential more fully. 
D. Counsel Choice and Democracy Enhancement 
Including poor people in the right to choose counsel serves a 
democracy-enhancing function on multiple levels in addition to checking 
concentrated judicial power. Inclusive attorney choice can force greater 
transparency from what currently are very opaque systems. Inclusive 
attorney choice also increases pressure to improve standards of attorney 
performance. As courts incorporate those improved standards into the 
governing law, inclusive attorney choice can strengthen the substantive 
                                                     
103. Id.; see also Dissell, supra note 88. 
104. Steven B. Bright, The Past and Future of the Right to an Attorney for Poor People Accused 
of Crimes, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 14 (John T. 
Parry & L. Song Richardson, eds., 2013) (describing “meet ’em and plead ’em” case processing). 
105. See, e.g., NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT xiii–xiv, 3–6, 21–32 (2016) (describing degrading effects 
of “courtroom work group” culture).  
106. Jeff Blackburn & Andrea Marsh, The New Performance Guidelines in Criminal Cases: A 
Step Forward for Texas Criminal Justice, 74 TEX. B.J. 616, 617 (2011), https://www.texasbar.com/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Texas_Bar_Journal&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=
14703 [https://perma.cc/JK7L-N5UD]. 
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meaning of the right to counsel. Finally, inclusive attorney choice can 
improve system legitimacy. This subsection focuses on the how an 
inclusive right of counsel choice can enhance democracy by improving 
information flow, raising pressure to improve counsel performance, and 
strengthening the substantive meaning of “assistance of counsel.” 
1. Improving Information Flow 
Meaningful attorney choice requires defender systems to disclose 
information on their own structures as well as on the lawyers who 
operate within those structures.107 System quality and attorney quality 
are separate issues. Defendants need information on both. 
Information on system quality includes levels of system compliance 
with the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles, including the 
political independence of the defense function.108 Thus, defendants 
should know who is making important decisions about the quality of 
their legal services. Optimally, those decisions would be made by a 
broad-based, state-wide commission that is not beholden to any branch 
of government.109 Alternatives devolve too easily, as legislators push 
low-bid contracts and judges appoint pay-to-play lawyers in exchange 
for campaign contributions110 or perfunctory, go-along-to-get-along 
advocacy.111 
According to the Ten Principles, the independent commission is more 
likely than the alternatives to promote both higher-quality defense 
service and greater system efficiency.112 Expanding the number of 
defendants who are able to exercise constitutionally-protected choice of 
counsel should force systems to self-disclose more of this information. 
System administrators can do so easily and at little cost through existing 
websites, intake forms, and other media. 
Meaningful choice also requires information on the existence and 
enforcement of standards for attorney qualification, training, 
                                                     
107. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice 
in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 334–36 (2015); Janet Moore, Indigent Defense 
Attorney Toolbox, U. OF CIN. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://guides.libraries.uc.edu/c.php?g=222533&p= 
1473687 [https://perma.cc/8222-E5HA]. It took the author and research assistants three years to 
compile this electronic multijurisdictional standards dataset, with the goal of creating a real-time, 
publicly accessible standards website. 
108. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93.  
109. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 185–91. 
110. See Dissell, supra note 88; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 80–84. 
111. See Blackburn & Marsh, supra note 106. 
112. See TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93. 
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performance, and workload.113 The existence and enforcement of such 
standards will turn in part on the degree to which systems provide 
resource parity between prosecutors and defenders, which is another 
important factor in evaluating quality defense representation.114 Other 
important standards include the ABA’s guidelines on excessive defender 
workloads115 and the same organization’s Formal Ethics Opinion 06-
441.116 Those standards are designed to prevent lawyers from taking or 
keeping cases when their workloads impede competent, diligent 
representation.117 “Competence” and “diligence” comprise the core 
duties to communicate, investigate, and advocate.118 
Thus, indigent defendants should know whether counsel’s failure to 
communicate or investigate—the two counsel-related problems most 
frequently reported by people facing criminal charges119—indicate 
structural flaws such as excessive caseloads and inadequate funding, 
training, and oversight. Defendants who know the governing standards 
and avenues for their enforcement are better positioned to identify and 
respond effectively to substandard performance, both in managing their 
own specific cases and in organizing support for system reform.120 An 
equal right to choice of counsel will increase the number of defendants 
                                                     
113. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (citing sources of formal standards). For 
examples of state-level standards, see Blackburn & Marsh, supra note 106, at 620–37, and NORTH 
CAROLINA COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. SERVS, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 1–2 (Nov. 12, 2004), 
http://www.ncids.org/Rules%20&%20Procedures/Performance%20Guidelines/Trial%20Level%20F
inal%20Performance%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6ZU-ALRH].  
114. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 263–68 (2004) (discussing the need for parity in resources for 
case investigation, evidence testing, expert testimony, and attorney hours to support constitutionally 
effective representation).  
115. EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (2009), http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guide 
lines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LUD-MNBU] [hereinafter Eight 
Guidelines]. 
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (May 13, 2006), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclai
d_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2E9-
D46U]. 
117. See id. 
118. Id. 
119. See Christopher C. Campbell, Janet Moore, Wesley Maier & Mike Gaffney, Unnoticed, 
Untapped, and Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of their Public Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 751, 759–61 (2015) (discussing quantitative analysis); id. at 761–64 (discussing focus group 
results). 
120. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15. 
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seeking such information, and push systems toward greater transparency 
and accountability. 
2. Attorney Choice and Grassroots Lawmaking 
The foregoing discussion underscores how including poor people in 
the right of attorney choice can raise pressure for systems to provide 
defendants with more and better information to empower better decision 
making in the exercise of that right. This Article claims such 
transparency as a democracy-enhancing function of the expanded 
constitutional right. The same democracy-enhancement framework 
enriches the dominant narrative surrounding that right. In that dominant 
narrative, constitutionally-protected attorney choice protects the 
autonomous individual’s purchase of services in the free market as a 
check on governmental threats to life, liberty, and property.121 
The democracy-enhancement framework extends the analysis from 
the market to the commons. That shift reveals the right’s potential as a 
mode of grassroots lawmaking that can check concentrated government 
power while strengthening the substantive meaning of the constitutional 
right to counsel. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to choose can be 
more than an anomalous constitutional right to shop—a right that is, by 
definition, reserved for those who can afford the price of entry. Instead, 
to borrow a phrase from Professor Heather Gerken, including poor 
people in the exercise of this right should speed “the democratic churn 
necessary for an ossified national system to move forward.”122 
This is so because an inclusive counsel-choice rule that applies to all 
defendants instead of a small minority can exponentially increase 
pressure to improve attorney performance standards. To date, that 
pressure has been created primarily by elites and has proved minimally 
effective. Freeing the majority of indigent defendants to exercise the 
right of counsel choice should increase that pressure. As discussed 
above, inclusive choice should force greater self-disclosure of 
information about system and attorney quality. That information should 
increase the number of defendants who request representation from 
better-performing lawyers. Those patterns of choice should encourage 
better standards of attorney performance. In the aggregate and over time, 
that grassroots pressure should raise expectations—including judicial 
                                                     
121. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); Schulhofer, supra note 91.  
122. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2010). 
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expectations—for the level of performance that can be deemed 
“reasonable” as a matter of constitutional law. 
In the longer term, a stronger defense function may help to rebalance 
criminal legal systems set askew by the widely acknowledged and 
historically unprecedented concentration of power in the prosecutorial 
function.123 Factors contributing to this imbalance of power include 
expansive criminal codes, virtually unchecked prosecutorial charging 
discretion, and imposition of higher punishment as a trial tax on 
defendants who refuse plea offers.124 These factors have helped to 
degrade many criminal legal systems into the plea mills125 and debtor’s 
prisons126 that feed hyperincarceration127 and undermine system 
legitimacy,128 particularly for the low-income people and people of color 
who are disproportionately enmeshed in these systems.129 
Thus, vindicating the Sixth Amendment right to choose for all 
defendants can provide a number of benefits. Those benefits include a 
democracy-enhancing function that can operate on multiple levels. 
Ultimately, inclusive choice may help to shore up the meaning and value 
of cognate rights that are guaranteed to criminal defendants and are in a 
state of decline correlative to increasing concentration of prosecutorial 
power.130 Those enfeebled guarantees include the prosecutor’s due 
                                                     
123. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2155–60 (2013). 
124. See id. Notably, concern over these developments spans the ideological spectrum. Cf. Alex 
Altman, Koch Brother Teams Up with Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform, TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/ZPT3-P4NW]. 
125. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013); 
Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/NK6P-U3H2] (discussing analysis of criminal justice reform advocate Susan 
Burton). 
126. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-253 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
2, 2015); Joseph Shapiro, In Ferguson, Court Fines and Fees Fuel Anger, NPR (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger 
[http://perma.cc/PS79-2CZS]. 
127. See Moore, supra note 7, at 553–54 & nn.61–62 (discussing distinction between mass 
incarceration and hyperincarcation) (citing Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race and Hyperincarceration in 
Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS 74, 78–79 (2010)); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
314–16 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) [hereinafter NRC REPORT]. 
128. See generally Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 754–55. 
129. See Moore, supra note 7, at nn.37–42. 
130. See id. at nn.70–76. 
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process duty to disclose information beneficial to the defense131 and the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.132 Their continued decline is a 
threat to liberty and warrants prompt intervention. 
Courts have aborted these potential benefits of an inclusive right to 
choose counsel. They have done so by imposing a discriminatory double 
standard that excludes the overwhelming majority of defendants from 
exercising agency at a pivotal point in their cases. Such participation can 
improve not only the content of the governing law, but also the 
legitimacy of the systems through which that law is created and 
administered. Both badly need shoring up. 
E. Counsel Choice and Legitimacy 
Democracy deficits have undermined the legitimacy of U.S. criminal 
legal systems to the point of rendering the term “criminal justice” 
oxymoronic or utopian.133 People who experience crime and carceral 
policies—whether as victims, witnesses, offenders or, as is often the 
case, in overlapping roles—are disproportionately poor people and 
people of color who have little voice in generating and administering the 
governing law.134 Excluding poor people from the Sixth Amendment 
right to choose counsel deepens that silence and compounds those 
democracy deficits. 
These democracy deficits are not new.135 Periodically, however, 
public and sometimes violent protest focuses fresh attention on the roles 
of race and socioeconomic class in the formation and implementation of 
criminal justice policies.136 Indeed, the episodic development of the 
indigent defendant’s right to government-paid counsel coincided with 
such protests.137 
                                                     
131. See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1329–30 (2012). 
132. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility 
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1399–400 (2000). 
133. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–63; Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond 
Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 119, 125–26 (2012) (defining legitimacy as the “necessarily conditional or 
defeasible” dialogic relationship involving “positive recognition by citizens of the powerholder’s 
moral right to exercise that power”) (emphases in original). 
134. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49.  
135. See id. at 560–62.  
136. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor, Civil Rights Leaders at Odds as Ferguson Protests Grow, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 28, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/28/as-
ferguson-protest-grows-so-do-tensions/20664395/ [https://perma.cc/ZL2F-UB6E]. 
137. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96. 
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Bursts of Supreme Court activity have occurred during periods of 
heightened national and international controversy over racialized 
socioeconomic inequalities in the United States and their disparate 
impact on criminal proceedings.138 Those periods, in the 1930s, 1960s, 
and early twenty-first century, have been marked by embarrassment over 
what historian John Hope Franklin described as the nation’s broken 
“promise of real equality.”139 
In the 1930s, international scrutiny and public protest surrounded 
litigation of Powell v. Alabama,140 which constitutionalized the right to 
capital defense counsel.141 During the Civil Rights era of the 1950s and 
1960s, similar scrutiny and protest surrounded the generation of the right 
to government-paid counsel in felony trials and in criminal appeals.142 
Twenty-first century embarrassments include the degeneration of 
criminal legal systems into the plea mills and debtor’s prisons that feed 
racially disparate patterns of hyperincarceration.143 As in the earlier 
periods, public protest and heightened international attention have been 
accompanied by expansions of the right to counsel.144 
It is important to note another key aspect of this doctrinal history. 
From its inception, the indigent defendant’s right to government-paid 
counsel has comprised an idiosyncratic federal constitutional mandate to 
distribute resources from haves to have-nots.145 That mandate derives 
from equal protection and due process principles as well as the Sixth 
Amendment text and related case law.146 The right to government-paid 
defense counsel is therefore an exception to what Professor Julie Nice 
describes as the effective deconstitutionalization of poverty law.147 
                                                     
138. Id. For a more recent example of such international attention, see Sam Fulwood, Race and 
Beyond: Putin Should Not Throw Stones (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.americanprogress. 
org/issues/race/news/2015/09/30/122391/putin-should-not-throw-stones/ [https://perma.cc/G8MT-
NTUN] (discussing President Vladimir Putin’s deflecting questions about democracy in Russia by 
pointing to policing practices in Ferguson, Missouri).  
139. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96; JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, DEMOCRACY 
BETRAYED: THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY xi–xii (David S. Cecelski & 
Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998). 
140. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
141. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–93. 
142. Id. at 1293–94. 
143. See supra notes 125–29. 
144. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1294–96. 
145. See Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move Beyond Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. J.1025, 1051–58 (2013). 
146. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96.  
147. Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules 
of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629–36 (2008). 
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This brief account locates the Court’s overtly discriminatory “no-
choice-for-the-poor” statements within a doctrinal history that reflects 
the contested role and meaning of equality as a constitutional norm.148 
That contestation includes repeated moments of geopoliticized 
embarrassment149 over this country’s distinctive intersection of race, 
poverty, and carceral policies. To be sure, it is no doubt true that 
“[e]quitable treatment was an underlying concern” as the Court sought 
“to reduce the disadvantages of poverty in litigation” by developing the 
right to government-paid counsel.150 It is no doubt equally true, 
however, that those judicial motives have been mixed.151 
The fragility of those mixed motives is reflected in the weak 
definition and enforcement of the indigent defendant’s right to counsel 
under Strickland, the resulting ongoing crisis of overloaded, 
underfunded, low-quality public defense service, and the role of that 
crisis in the wider upheaval over U.S. carceral policies.152 Public 
concern is further piqued by unprecedented, budget-busting levels of 
hyperincarceration153 and economic inequality.154 News headlines 
trumpet disparities and unfairness in grand jury charging155 as well as in 
other criminal legal processes and outcomes.156 Predictable responses 
                                                     
148. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 7, at 558–63, 575–86. 
149. See supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text. 
150. Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive 
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1424 (2002) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344 (1963)). 
151. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in THE 
LEGAL STUDIES READER: A CONVERSATION & READINGS ABOUT THE LAW 250, 253 (George 
Wright & Maria Stalzer Wyan Cuzzo eds., 2004); Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: 
Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 248, 250–52 (2012) 
(discussing Professor Bell’s interest-convergence and racial-realism theories).  
152. See supra sections I.B–D. 
153. See supra note 123127 and accompanying text. 
154. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49 & nn.37–38; see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–26, 246–50, 291–304 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) 
(discussing patterns). 
155. See, e.g., Maria Gallucci, Tamir Rice Shooting: Protesters Call for Cleveland Prosecutor to 
Resign After Grand Jury Declines to Indict Officers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/tamir-rice-shooting-protesters-call-cleveland-prosecutor-resign-after-
grand-jury-2246699 [https://perma.cc/5QVT-AFS5]; James Pinkerton, Bulletproof, Part 3: Hard to 
Charge, HOUS. CHRON. (2013), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/investigations/item/ 
Bulletproof-Part-3-Hard-to-charge-24421.php [https://perma.cc/25V9-R542] (discussing an 
investigation that raises questions about whether the grand jury system in Harris County favors the 
police). 
156. See supra notes 125–29. 
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include more task forces issuing another round of reports.157 History 
indicates that such responses will have minimal impact on the resilient 
interlocking set of networked institutions and policies that comprise the 
carceral state.158 
Breaking this Sisyphean cycle requires a new analytical framework. 
The dominant theories of criminal law (retributive/utilitarian), criminal 
procedure (due process/crime control), and constitutionally-protected 
attorney choice (libertarian-free market)159 are inadequate to support 
meaningful or sustainable criminal justice reform. The democracy-
enhancing approach offers an alternative.160 
Viewed from a democracy-enhancement perspective, overt judicial 
discrimination in the vindication of the Sixth Amendment right to 
choose counsel concentrates judicial power and prevents grassroots 
lawmaking. The same de jure discrimination also undermines system 
legitimacy by denigrating the agency and silencing the voices of poor 
people, who are disproportionately people of color. Indeed, some judges 
expressly justify excluding poor people from the right of attorney choice 
by claiming to have greater expertise in evaluating attorney qualification 
and performance than indigent defendants.161 But as Dean Norman 
Lefstein notes, there is no reason to think that indigent defendants in the 
United States are less savvy than those in England and other common 
law countries, which trust poor people to choose their own lawyers 
instead of forcing them into arranged matches.162 
Moreover, claims of superior judicial expertise in evaluating counsel 
performance denigrate the agency of poor people and people of color by 
                                                     
157. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76865 (Dec. 18, 2014); cf. NRC REPORT, 
supra note 127; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 11 (1968); OHIO COMM’N ON RACIAL FAIRNESS, REPORT 
OF THE OHIO COMMISSION ON RACIAL FAIRNESS 36–56 (1999). 
158. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2014) (discussing the interlocking, resilient structures that compose the 
carceral state and render it resistant to reform); cf. Utah v. Strieff, __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 
2070−71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (interpreting majority’s construction of Fourth 
Amendment as “impl[ying] that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral 
state, just waiting to be cataloged”). 
159. Moore, supra note 7, at 550, 563–69; see also supra notes 8–10. 
160. Moore, supra note 7, at 550, 563–69. 
161. See, e.g., Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Cal. 1973) 
(justifying denial of a capital murder defendant’s request for appointment of an available, qualified, 
conflict-free lawyer despite appointed counsel’s request to be removed from the case due to lack of 
experience because “the court knew [appointed counsel] to be competent [and that] he had 
previously served as court appointed counsel”). 
162. See Lefstein, supra note 90, at 918–20.  
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reinforcing stereotypes of their dependence, irrationality, and 
incapacity.163 It is precisely because these communities have 
disproportionate contact with crime and criminal legal systems that they 
are well-positioned to assess defense performance.164 The participatory 
defense movement exemplifies that expertise.165 
Participatory defense is a social justice movement that applies 
community organizing strategies to improve public defense.166 The 
movement shows that the collective wisdom of the community can 
outstrip that of court personnel when it comes to evaluating (and 
demanding) quality defense.167 Other research tends to corroborate this 
point. Indeed, when empirical researchers bother to ask indigent 
defendants what they think about their lawyers, the evidence shows a 
good deal of sophistication (as well as some surprising empathy) in 
those assessments.168 
The few other proffered justifications for the “no-choice” stance are 
also more reflexive than reasoned.169 For example, judges have warned 
of delays if untrammeled choice “allow[s] a popular attorney to have the 
courts marking time to serve his convenience.”170 But the constitutional 
right to choose counsel does not include lawyers with full dance cards. 
An equal right of counsel choice limits the choices of all defendants to 
lawyers who are available to resolve cases within timelines established 
through the court’s calendaring authority.171 
More often than not, judges simply adopt the “no-choice” stance with 
no justification whatsoever. That is, they state summarily that indigents 
are entitled to constitutionally effective assistance and nothing more.172 
Professor Wayne Holly translates such assertions into an underlying 
premise that “beggars can’t be choosers.”173 Professor Holly counters 
                                                     
163. Cf. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 105–
06 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing processes of social stratification). 
164. Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49. 
165. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1281–91. 
166. Id. at 1282–83. 
167. Id. at 1281–91. 
168. See id. at 1309–14; Campbell et al., supra note 119. 
169. See Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: 
Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 
64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 201 (1998). 
170. See, e.g., People v. Dowell, 266 P. 807, 809 (Cal. 1928).  
171. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 
U.S. 1 (1983)). 
172. See Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Cal. 1973). 
173. Holly, supra note 169, at 182–83. 
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that most indigent defendants should have constitutionally-protected 
attorney choice because they do have skin in the game; they pay for 
counsel through contribution and recoupment procedures.174 
Other scholars have argued against the “no-choice” stance based on 
equal protection,175 promotion of attorney-client trust and individual 
autonomy,176 and market efficiencies as clients “drive out” bad lawyers 
by rewarding the good.177Such arguments led The New York Times to 
promote attorney choice for all defendants,178 and encouraged the Texas 
Indigent Defense Commission to test what appears to be the nation’s 
first attorney-choice program for poor people in a single rural county.179 
The scholarly arguments against the “no-choice” stance are well 
taken, and the Texas experiment is worth watching.180 Nevertheless, 
prior arguments for an inclusive right to attorney choice have missed a 
bigger payoff. The Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel has strong 
democracy-enhancing potential. Including poor people in the right to 
choose counsel fulfills core constitutional values by promoting equal 
participation in the generation and administration of law.181 As a mode 
of grassroots lawmaking, attorney choice promotes transparency and 
accountability while checking concentrated judicial and executive power 
and improving system legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, a discriminatory double standard infects the right of 
counsel choice. That discrimination results primarily from a widespread 
misimpression that the Supreme Court has established as a matter of law 
that indigent defendants have no Sixth Amendment right to choose 
counsel.182 Part II’s fresh scrutiny of the case law exposes those “no-
choice” statements as dicta. The analysis also shows how those dicta 
                                                     
174. Id. at 218–24. 
175. Peter W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 87–
89 (1974). 
176. See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 541–45. Professor Hoeffel argues for the narrower right 
to continue a relationship with an appointed lawyer. Id. 
177. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 10.  
178. Adam Liptak, Need-Blind Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/01/05/sunday-review/need-blind-justice.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3X2D-S93L]. 
179. Id.; see also supra notes 91–92. A recent census of Comal County, the site of the Texas 
attorney-choice experiment, reports the population of 108,000 is 69.5% white and 26.2% Latino-
Hispanic with median household income of $65,839 and a poverty rate of 10.2%. See State & 
County Quickfacts Comal County Report, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/48/48091.html [http://perma.cc/SS2V-2JVN]. 
180. But see infra Part IV (discussing problems with the Texas project). 
181. See Moore, supra note 7, at 563–65. 
182. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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have distracted courts and commentators from reasoning and rulings in 
the same Supreme Court cases that strongly support a right of counsel 
choice for all defendants. The analysis offers tools for advocates to 
dismantle the “no-choice” rule and end de jure discrimination against 
poor people in the vindication of this fundamental constitutional right. 
II. DEMOCRATIZING COUNSEL CHOICE: A NEW LOOK AT 
SUPREME COURT CASE LAW 
This Part corrects the widespread misunderstanding that Supreme 
Court statements excluding poor people from constitutionally-protected 
attorney choice are holdings. Section II.A shows that those “no-choice” 
statements are dicta belied by the Court’s own reasoning and rulings, 
including due process and equal protection doctrines discussed in section 
II.B. 
A. The Court’s Discriminatory Dicta 
There are three Supreme Court cases that courts and commentators 
cite most frequently when asserting that people who require 
government-paid counsel are categorically excluded from exercising the 
Sixth Amendment right to attorney choice that is enjoyed by those with 
means to hire counsel. In chronological order by date of decision, those 
cases are Wheat v. United States,183 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. 
United States,184 and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.185 The first two 
decisions, Wheat and Caplin, rejected right-to-choose claims and 
restricted the right’s application.186 
Only the third of these frequently-cited cases, Gonzalez-Lopez, 
vindicated the right to choose through structural error review.187 More 
recently, however, in Luis v. United States188 the Court followed 
Gonzalez-Lopez and held that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment 
right to access $2 million in assets that were “untainted” by an alleged 
$45 million criminal conspiracy in order to hire her chosen counsel.189 
                                                     
183. 486 U.S. 153 (1988); see KAMISAR, ET AL., supra note 1 (citing Wheat). 
184. 491 U.S. 617 (1989). Caplin was issued on the same day, and with a similar holding and 
reasoning as a companion case, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
185. 548 U.S. 140 (2006); see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez).  
186. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 617. 
187. 548 U.S. at 150. 
188. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
189. Id. at 1087–88. 
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All four of these cases were hotly contested; each was decided by the 
narrowest possible one-vote margin.190 The four cases share two other 
key characteristics. First, each recites the “no-choice-for-the-poor” 
mantra.191 Second, none of the defendants were indigent. Each had 
ample means to hire counsel.192 
Statements in these Supreme Court cases that dismiss the indigent 
defendant’s right to choose are therefore dicta.193 Similar “no-choice” 
dicta appear in three other important Supreme Court cases that do 
involve indigent defendants and the exercise of choice in the 
appointment of counsel. Those cases are Faretta v. California,194 Morris 
v. Slappy,195 and Montejo v. Louisiana.196 
This Part provides an integrated analysis of these seven cases. The 
analysis supports three conclusions. First, the Court’s statements 
excluding poor people from constitutionally protected attorney choice 
have limited precedential value. Second, the Court’s own limitations on 
the Sixth Amendment right to choose answer some of the most 
significant practical concerns about vindicating the right for poor people. 
The cases allow judges to override attorney choice if the lawyer is 
unqualified, unavailable, unwilling, or has a conflict of interest.197 These 
restrictions make it unlikely that current methods for connecting 
defendants with attorneys would be overwhelmed by a rule protecting 
the right to attorney choice for indigent defendants as well as those who 
can afford to hire counsel. 
Third, previously unnoticed subtexts in Faretta and Montejo provide 
additional grounds for supporting a right of counsel choice that applies 
to indigent defendants as well as to those who can afford to hire counsel. 
                                                     
190. See Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1087; Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152–53; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 634–
36; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164–65, 172. 
191. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1093 (plurality opinion); id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1110 
(Kennedy & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152–53; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 624; 
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59. 
192. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1087–88; Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 620–21; 
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 155. 
193. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960–
61 (2005) (reasoning that an issue must be “actually decided . . . based upon the facts of the case” to 
qualify as a holding); Judith M. Stinson, Teaching the Holding/Dictum Distinction, 19 
PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 192 (2011) (“[M]ost typically ‘holding’ is 
defined as that portion of a legal opinion that is ‘necessary to the result.’”). 
194. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
195. 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
196. 556 U.S. 778 (2008). 
197. See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164 (holding that a court can deny counsel choice to prevent 
conflict of interest). 
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Faretta shows that an inclusive right to choose counsel can increase 
perceptions of system legitimacy while saving time and money.198 
Montejo emphasizes the importance of indigent defendants’ choices 
about legal representation, even when counsel is automatically 
appointed.199 These new insights into Faretta and Montejo bookend the 
case analysis below. 
1. The Right of Forced Refusal: Faretta’s Untold Story 
Faretta v. California might seem odd support for an inclusive right to 
choose counsel, since the case created the right to refuse counsel.200 The 
case came to the Supreme Court because Anthony Faretta thought he 
could do a better job defending himself than his public defender, who he 
alleged was overworked,201 biased, and conflicted.202 The trial judge 
refused to allow Faretta to represent himself and kept the public 
defender on the case.203 The jury heard strong evidence of Faretta’s 
guilt, and found that he had committed multiple felonies.204 
Despite the evidence and verdicts, the Supreme Court found that the 
trial judge violated Faretta’s Sixth Amendment right to represent 
himself.205 Moreover, the Court did not apply harmless-error analysis, 
which is the typical standard of review for violations of constitutional 
rights.206 Instead, the Court reversed under the structural error standard, 
that is, without asking whether Faretta could have done better without 
his unwanted lawyer.207 The dissent derided the defendant’s new 
constitutional “right . . . to make a fool of himself.”208 The majority 
conceded that self-representation would likely harm defendants, but 
                                                     
198. See infra section II.A.1. 
199. See infra section II.A.5. 
200. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). 
201. Id. at 807. 
202. Joint App. at 49, 54, 58–59, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (No. 73-5772) [hereinafter 
Faretta JA]. 
203. Id. at 58–59.  
204. Id. at 11–19, 26. 
205. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–36. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of 
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 442, 
444–46 (2007) (presenting data on positive pro se outcomes while conceding the study’s 
limitations). 
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insisted that the right to refuse court-appointed counsel vindicates “that 
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”209 
Faretta is traditionally viewed as championing individual autonomy 
against overbearing government authority.210 More specifically, the 
standard narrative claims the case as safeguarding the liberty of poor 
people against social-welfare paternalism.211 But that narrative elides a 
crucial and often ignored fact: Anthony Faretta wanted a government-
paid lawyer.212 
Citing the Sixth Amendment, Faretta “urged without success that he 
was entitled to counsel of his choice, and three times moved for the 
appointment of a lawyer other than the public defender” whom the 
judges had chosen for him.213 Courts routinely appoint such “panel” or 
“list” lawyers, often when public defender offices are overloaded or 
have conflicts.214 
By invoking his right to choose counsel, Faretta offered an alternative 
to three unattractive options. The first unattractive option was for Faretta 
to proceed without a lawyer. The second was for Faretta to proceed with 
the unwanted lawyer from the public defender office. The third was 
years of subsequent litigation ending in reversal of Faretta’s convictions. 
Instead of granting Faretta’s request for a different lawyer or his 
back-up request to represent himself, the trial judge forced him to 
proceed with the unwanted public defender and infected the proceedings 
with structural error.215 Interestingly, Faretta’s right-to-choose claim was 
not addressed on direct appeal, despite the facts that he raised the issue 
at trial and that the issue was pending before the state Supreme Court.216 
                                                     
209. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, 
J., concurring)). 
210. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165 
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant, 
after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the 
State. Any other approach is unworthy of a free people.”).  
211. Id. (stating that the Framers “would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment 
of counsel by the government to plead a criminal defendant’s case” (emphasis in original)); see also 
id. (stating that such an imposition “‘imprison[s] a man in his privileges and call[s] it the 
Constitution.’” (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942))). 
212. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811 n.5; Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 49. 
213. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811 n.5; Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 49. 
214. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82–84. 
215. Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 50, 54, 58–59.  
216. Id. at 25–26 (appending People v. Faretta 1–2 (2d Dist. Crim. No. 22722, June 26, 1973)); 
see also Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007 (Cal. 1973). Drumgo issued on 
March 5, 1973—well after Faretta’s 1972 trial proceedings, but before his appeal was decided. 
Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 25. 
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Nor did Faretta include the right-to-choose claim in his pro se petition to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.217 Only the lone Supreme Court amicus brief 
urged reversal based on the violation of Faretta’s right to choose.218 The 
majority opinion submerged the issue in a passing reference to 
California’s “not unusual rule[] . . . [that a]n indigent criminal defendant 
has no right to appointed counsel of his choice.”219 
Thus, the “no-choice-for-the-poor” statement was literally a footnote 
in Faretta.220 Excavating Faretta’s subtext exposes an untold right-to-
choose story that counters the traditional right-to-refuse case narrative. 
In the guise of “affirm[ing] the dignity and autonomy” of the 
individual,221 Faretta substitutes one form of coercion for another and 
gores indigent defendants on a sharp-horned dilemma. Unable to secure 
counsel of choice, they must proceed either with an unwanted attorney 
or with unwanted (and as the Court conceded, probably prejudicial) pro 
se status.222 
Thus, Faretta won the oxymoronic right of being forced to refuse 
counsel. This conundrum may help explain why the Court has imposed 
many subsequent restrictions on Faretta while insisting that pro se 
defendants “may, at least occasionally” present their own “best possible 
defense.”223 Faretta’s untold story raises other possibilities. On one 
hand, Faretta might have been unhappy with, and rejected the assistance 
of any lawyer appointed to his case. On the other hand, granting 
indigents like Faretta the right to choose counsel “may, at least 
occasionally”—and likely would, more often—prevent protracted 
litigation, preserve finality of judgments, promote attorney-client 
cooperation, and shore up system legitimacy. 
Despite these potential benefits of an inclusive Sixth Amendment 
right of attorney choice that applies equally to all defendants, Supreme 
                                                     
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (No. 73-5772). 
218. Brief for Amicus Curiae John E. Thorne at 9–15, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) 
(No. 73-5772). 
219. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812 n.8 (citing Drumgo, 506 P.2d 1007). Drumgo was decided after 
Faretta’s trial and while his appeal was pending. See supra note 216. 
220. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 810 n.5, 812 n.8. 
221. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984). 
222. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812 n.8. 
223. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177, 184–85 (approving appointment of “standby” trial counsel); see 
also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (approving appointment of counsel over the 
objection of mentally ill defendant found competent to stand trial); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of 
Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (denying right to proceed pro se on direct 
appeal). 
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Court cases decided after Faretta continued to recite dicta denigrating 
the indigent defendant’s interest in the identity of his or her lawyer. 
2. No Right to the Relationship?: Morris v. Slappy 
Morris v. Slappy is like Faretta in that neither case involved a 
Supreme Court ruling on the broad Sixth Amendment right of indigent 
defendants to choose their lawyers.224 Courts and commentators 
sometimes mistakenly cite Slappy as rejecting the indigent defendant’s 
right to choose; in support, they recite the majority’s grumpy statement 
that criminal defendants have “no Sixth Amendment right to a 
meaningful [attorney-client] relationship.”225 Professor Janet Hoeffel 
correctly describes those words as dicta.226 This subpart builds on 
Professor Hoeffel’s argument by explaining the distinction between 
Slappy’s holding and dicta, as well as the implications of that distinction 
for an inclusive right of attorney choice that applies equally to all 
defendants. 
Slappy arose in the opposite circumstances of Faretta. Shortly before 
Joseph Slappy’s trial, his public defender was hospitalized.227 Slappy 
wanted to keep that lawyer on his case.228 Instead, despite Slappy’s 
protests, the judge ordered another public defender to take over.229 
Slappy was convicted of multiple serious felonies and lost his state court 
appeals.230 A Ninth Circuit panel held that the trial judge had improperly 
denied Slappy’s motion to continue the case.231 The panel concluded that 
the judge’s ruling violated the Sixth Amendment, applied structural error 
review, and ordered a new trial.232 
The Supreme Court reversed.233 All nine justices agreed on a single 
procedural ground for reversing: the Ninth Circuit mistook Slappy’s 
                                                     
224. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 525, 534 (2007) (discussing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)). 
225. See, e.g., Virgen v. Ryan, No. CV-13-1294-TUC-DTF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141861, at 
*17 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2014); SALTZBURG, ET AL., supra note 1. 
226.  Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 526, 528–32, 545–50 (discussing Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–15 & 
n.6).  
227. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 5. 
228. Id. at 8. 
229. Id. at 5–9; id. at 25–26 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the trial court’s failure to 
inquire into likely length of delay). 
230. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 718–20 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 1 
(1983). 
231. Id.  
232. Id.  
233. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 15. 
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protests as a timely motion to continue.234 All nine justices also agreed 
that the trial judge properly exercised his calendaring authority and 
properly sought timely resolution of Slappy’s cases by proceeding with 
substitute counsel.235 In the course of ruling on these procedural 
grounds, the majority went on to opine that “there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship,” and 
described that statement as a “holding.”236 Lower courts occasionally 
cite this “holding” to override indigent defendants’ choice of counsel.237 
A closer reading shows that those citations are unsupported. First, 
they fail to account for the full text of the “no right to a relationship” 
statement. The majority went on to explain that “[n]o court could 
possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with 
his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—that the 
Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
counsel.”238 Properly understood, the “no right to a relationship” 
statement merely sets inarguable boundaries for any positive 
constitutional right: it must be clearly defined in order to be judicially 
enforced. 
The second reason that Slappy does not support the “no-choice” 
stance is procedural. Despite the majority’s labeling of the “no right to a 
relationship” statement as a “holding,” all nine justices also described 
the statement and related discussion as unnecessary to resolving the 
case.239 Such unnecessary discussion is dictum.240 The Court has also 
(sometimes) followed a “settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of 
                                                     
234. Id. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist & O’Connor, 
JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
235.  Id. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist & O’Connor, 
JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., 
concurring). 
236. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–15, 14 n.6.  
237. See, e.g., Virgen v. Ryan, No. CV-13-1294-TUC-DTF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141861, at 
*17 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2014). 
238. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14. 
239. Id. at 4 (opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist, & O’Connor, JJ.) (describing 
procedural ground as “dispositive, independent of the . . . novel Sixth Amendment guarantee 
announced by the Court of Appeals”); id. at 15, 19 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (citing 
majority’s “recognition that [the Sixth Amendment issue] is unnecessary to its decision”); id. at 29 
(Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (describing the majority’s Sixth Amendment discussion as 
“dicta”). 
240. Judicial dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (10th ed. 2010) (defining “judicial dictum” 
as “[a]n opinion by a court . . . that is not essential to the decision and therefore not binding”); see 
also Stinson, supra note 193. 
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constitutional issues.”241 That policy may have led all nine justices to 
indicate that their unanimous agreement on the lack of a timely 
continuance motion was dispositive to the case, rendering the “no right 
to a relationship” statements superfluous.242 
That reasoning follows even if one allows alternative grounds as 
holdings.243 Fleshing out the distinction between Slappy’s dicta and 
holding reduces the precedential value of the case for those who would 
continue to deny indigent defendants the same Sixth Amendment right to 
choose counsel that is enjoyed by defendants with means to hire counsel. 
As Professor Hoeffel argues, at minimum those dicta should not 
dissuade judges from advancing Sixth Amendment concerns for fairness 
and finality by deferring to existing attorney-client relationships when 
ruling on motions to continue.244 
In fact, Slappy offers strong support for an inclusive right to attorney 
choice that applies equally to all defendants. The Court itself has made 
this point clear by citing Slappy as commanding strong deference to 
courts’ calendaring authority.245 Judges exercise that authority from the 
earliest stage of criminal proceedings when attorney-client relationships 
are first being formed. They do so whether those relationships involve 
retained or appointed counsel. These preexisting practices, and the 
resulting limitations on attorney choice in our current systems for 
connecting clients with counsel, should ease transitions to an inclusive 
right of counsel choice rule that applies equally to all defendants. The 
same is true of the additional restrictions that the Court imposed upon 
attorney choice in Wheat246 and Caplin247—despite the subsequent 
easing of one such restriction in Luis.248 
                                                     
241. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305 (1982). 
242. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, 
Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring); id. at 29 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
243. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 193, at 953, 961, 972 (holdings must “lead to the 
judgment” but may include “alternative justifications”); see id. at 1029–32 (distinguishing 
supportive and nonsupportive propositions, cautioning that judicial resolution of issues “in a manner 
that does not contribute to the disposition of the case [indicates] a strong possibility that the 
judge . . . holds relatively strong views”). 
244. Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 540–45; cf. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721–22 (9th Cir. 
1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983). 
245. Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1107 (2014); United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006). 
246. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 154 (1988) (holding that Sixth Amendment 
presumption in favor of counsel can be overcome by demonstration of conflict or serious potential 
for conflict). 
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3. Rights, Risks, and Retainers: Wheat, Caplin, and Luis 
Like Morris v. Slappy, Wheat v. United States and Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States held that competing interests can 
trump a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose his or her 
lawyer.249 Slappy requires deference to the trial judge’s calendaring 
authority.250 In Wheat, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer’s conflict 
of interest can trump the right to choose that lawyer—even when the 
defendant waives the protection against such conflict, and even when 
prosecutors arguably manufactured the conflict to bump a successful 
defense lawyer off the case.251 In Caplin, the Court held that interests in 
crime suppression can trump attorney choice—even when asset 
forfeitures require law firms to surrender large retainers and fees.252 
The defendants in Wheat and Caplin had ample means to hire their 
lawyers.253 Therefore, the question whether indigent defendants have a 
Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel was not before the Court in 
either case. In Wheat, the issue of constitutionally-protected attorney 
choice for indigents was wholly irrelevant to the question whether 
conflicts of interest could trump the right to attorney choice. The Wheat 
majority nevertheless noted in passing, while discussing other 
restrictions on the Sixth Amendment right to choose, that “a defendant 
may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or who 
for other reasons declines to represent the defendant.”254 
The Wheat majority cited no authority for this dictum. Nevertheless, 
the Caplin majority seized it and doubled down. In that case, the Court 
rejected a law firm’s attempt to recover fees that were forfeited to the 
government after the client pled guilty.255 The firm argued that the 
government violated its client’s Sixth Amendment right to choose 
                                                     
247. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989) (holding that a 
forfeiture statute does not impermissibly burden a Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of one’s 
choice). 
248. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
249. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 618; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154. 
250. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 17–19 (Brennan, 
J., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
251. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163 (acknowledging risk of manufactured conflict); id. at 170 n.3 
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (citing evidence of prosecutorial bad faith). 
252. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 619–21. 
253. See supra note 192. 
254. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59. 
255. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623–25. 
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counsel by seizing the assets he would have used to pay the firm.256 In 
the course of the opinion, the Caplin majority stated that: 
Petitioner does not, nor could it defensibly do so, assert that 
impecunious defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 
choose their counsel. . . . [T]hose who do not have the means to 
hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as 
they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the 
courts.257 
The Caplin court then vindicated the government’s “pecuniary 
interest” in the defendant’s multimillion dollar assets.258 The Court 
concluded that ill-gotten gains do not properly belong to wrongdoers, 
and therefore eliminated the defendant’s “undeserved economic 
power . . . to command high-priced legal talent.”259 For such people, the 
Court reasoned, appointed or pro bono counsel would suffice,260 given 
“the harsh reality” that quality representation often turns on hiring “the 
best counsel money can buy.”261 A companion case applied the same 
reasoning to approve pretrial, post-indictment forfeiture of assets that the 
defendant otherwise would have used to pay counsel of choice.262 
                                                     
256. Id. at 621–22. 
257. Id. at 624. 
258. Id. at 626–30; see also id. at 629 n.6 (noting the government’s sale of “just one [of the 
defendant’s assets], a parcel of land known as ‘Shelburne Glebe,’ . . . for $ 5.3 million.”); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to 
Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 718–20 (1992) (discussing government interests in preventing 
attorney facilitation of organized criminal activity). 
259. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 630 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered, 837 F. 2d 637, 649 (1988)). 
260. Id. at 625. 
261. Id. at 630 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  
262. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989); see also Kaley v. United States, 
__ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102–03 (2014) (following Monsanto to hold that the Sixth 
Amendment does not require pretrial hearings to challenge asset freezes based on alleged lack of 
probable cause to prosecute). But see id. at 1105 (inviting Congressional override); Luis v. United 
States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016) (plurality opinion) (pretrial forfeiture of 
“untainted” assets violates Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel); id. at 1096–97 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1112 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing Monsanto as “troubling” 
and “not altogether convinc[ing],” but noting that since Luis did not ask the Court to overrule or 
modify Monsanto the Court had to take the case “as a given”). On the Kaley invitation for 
Congressional override, see U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Q&A: Civil Asset Forfeiture (Apr. 20, 
2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/ news/commentary/qa-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma. 
cc/UK6V-RPA2] (“Part of addressing this problem lies in reversing the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision that allows the government to prevent people from showing that they need access to their 
seized funds to hire a lawyer.”); Jonathan P. Bach, Written Statement on Behalf of the New York 
Council of Defense Lawyers Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary for the 
Hearing Entitled “The Need to Reform Asset Forfeiture” (Apr. 15, 2015), 
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The Caplin dissent attacked the majority rulings in both of these 
companion cases for subordinating the right of well-off defendants to 
buy a top-shelf commodity.263 The dissent warned that to “beggar” 
people of means—that is, to put them on the same plane as indigents 
with overworked, underfunded public defenders—would 
“[devastate] . . . our adversarial system of justice” and dirty courts’ 
hands by besmirching “the integrity of the judicial process.”264 Such 
degradation threatened the attorney-client trust required “to be a truly 
effective advocate” because appointed counsel “is too readily perceived 
as the Government’s agent rather than [the defendant’s] own.”265 The 
dissent also predicted that forfeiture would drive high-priced talent out 
of the market, causing the “virtual socialization of criminal 
defense . . . [,] standardiz[ed] . . . criminal-defense services and 
diminish[ed] defense counsel[] independence.”266 
It is difficult to imagine a more open and forceful indictment of the 
Court’s failure to enforce a meaningful Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel for the poor than the Caplin dissent’s denunciation of indigent 
defense representation. Comments about indigent defendants in these 
majority and dissenting opinions also mark the Court’s nearest approach 
to an actual ruling that poor people have no right to choose their lawyers. 
On this reading, it is only because indigents have no such right that the 
Court could transform otherwise well-off defendants into beggars who 
cannot be choosers. 
Closer scrutiny and subsequent case law show that such a reading is 
mistaken. Statements in Caplin regarding the lack of constitutionally 
protected attorney choice for indigents are unnecessary to the holding of 
the case.267 Instead of holding as a matter of law that indigent defendants 
have no right to choose their lawyers, Caplin instead followed Slappy 
and Wheat in holding that a sufficiently strong countervailing 
governmental interest can trump the right to choose counsel.268 In 
Slappy, the Court protected judicial discretion over dockets and court 
calendars.269 In Wheat, the Court protected the integrity of criminal 
                                                     
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-15-15%20Bach%20Testimony.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XWW4-FSBM] (arguing for amendment reversing Kaley). 
263. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 644–48 (Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
264. Id. at 635, 645. 
265. Id. at 645. 
266. Id.  
267. See supra notes 192–93. 
268. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625–33. 
269. See supra section II.A.2. 
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proceedings from conflicts of interest.270 In Caplin, the Court protected 
government interests in separating criminals from their ill-gotten 
gains.271 
The rulings in these cases turn on the Court’s weighing of the 
countervailing government interest. The rulings do not turn on the 
separate question whether indigent defendants have the same 
(trumpable) Sixth Amendment right to choose their lawyers as 
defendants who have the means to hire counsel. Significantly, four 
members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, applied exactly this 
type of interest-balancing analysis to right-to-choose limitations in Luis 
v. United States,272 and a fifth Justice appears prepared to do the same.273 
In Luis, the government froze $2 million of the defendant’s assets as 
potentially forfeitable due to her alleged involvement in a criminal 
conspiracy.274 The defendant claimed that the freeze involved 
“legitimate, untainted” assets that were “not traceable to a criminal 
offense,” which she needed in order to hire the lawyers she wanted to 
work on her case.275 The plurality concluded that the government’s 
interest in the untainted assets could not trump the defendant’s 
countervailing Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel.276 Justice 
Kagan expressed sympathy with that conclusion in her dissent.277 
While applying this interest-balancing approach to the right to choose 
counsel, the Luis plurality, like the Caplin dissent, was solicitous of the 
“substantial risk” that forcing wealthy defendants into overburdened 
public defense systems through asset forfeiture would render their Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel “less effective.”278 Two dissenting Justices 
in Luis found that allegation “troubling,” and condemned the majority’s 
“constitutional command to treat a defendant accused of committing a 
                                                     
270. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 258–62 and accompanying text.  
272. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1093–94 (2016) (describing government 
interests in the defendant’s assets as “important” but “compared to the right to counsel of 
choice . . . seem[ing] to lie somewhat further from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice 
system”).  
273. Id. at 1112 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (doubting whether “[g]overnment’s interest in recovering 
the proceeds of crime ought to trump the defendant’s . . . right to retain counsel of choice”). 
274. Id. at 1087–88. 
275. Id. at 1088. 
276. Id. at 1086. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion concluded that no balancing test applied. 
Id. at 1101–03 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
277. Id. at 1112. 
278. Id. at 1095. 
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lucrative crime differently than a defendant who is indigent from the 
outset.”279 
Those dissenting Justices in Luis hinted at the equal protection 
problems infecting the differential treatment of indigent defendants and 
defendants with means to hire counsel regarding the fundamental 
constitutional right to choose counsel. Those problems are unpacked 
more fully in section II.B. For current purposes, it suffices to note that, 
despite their differences in Luis, all eight Justices invoke the “no-choice-
for-the-poor” mantra.280 As the foregoing analysis shows, however, 
reciting a mantra does not make the mantra law. The Court could have 
reached the same results in these cases even if the indigent defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to choose were firmly established as a matter of 
law. In that scenario, forcing people into public defense systems through 
forfeiture of tainted assets would simply narrow their field of choice to 
the same set of qualified, conflict-free counsel who made themselves 
available to indigents. The fact that the range of choices would be 
narrower does not mean that there would be no right to choose at all. 
Deeper understanding of the substantive and procedural importance of 
that right, and the unconstitutional, antidemocratic effects of denying 
that right to poor people, requires a closer look at United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez. 
4. Gonzalez-Lopez and the Sixth Amendment Right to Shop 
Gonzalez-Lopez is distinguished among right-to-choose cases because 
the government conceded that the trial judge violated that right.281 The 
sole issue before the Court was the appropriate standard of review.282 
The Court affirmed the majority rule in the lower courts that the error is 
structural and requires automatic reversal without either the harmless-
error inquiry typical of other federal constitutional claims or the more 
onerous performance-and-prejudice inquiry of Strickland v. 
                                                     
279. Id. at 1110 (Kennedy and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
280. Id. at 1089 (plurality opinion); id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1109 (Kennedy & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102–03 (2014) 
(majority opinion authored by Justice Kagan). 
281. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006). Other Supreme Court cases in 
addition to those discussed here affirm the criminal defendant’s right to have an opportunity to hire 
a lawyer. See, e.g., Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (construing due process right to 
counsel and stating that “a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult 
with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth”). 
282. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 140–41. 
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Washington.283 Thus, the ruling elevated a criminal defendant’s right to 
choose an attorney into the tiny structural-error pantheon comprising the 
rights to an impartial judge, a public trial, and a grand jury selected 
without racial discrimination.284 The terse majority opinion 
accomplished that result in two moves. 
First, the Court distinguished two Sixth Amendment rights: the right 
to choose a particular lawyer and the right to receive effective assistance 
from that lawyer.285 The majority reasoned that, although it is “the 
purpose of [both] rights . . . to ensure a fair trial,” the right to choose a 
lawyer “has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of 
ensuring a fair trial.”286 Nor, it must be added, is the right to choose 
contained in the Amendment’s textual guarantee that an accused will 
“have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”287 Assistance means 
“help,”288 which a defendant can “have” just as readily through 
benevolence or performance of assigned duty as through the purchase of 
services in the marketplace. 
The right to choose is similarly deracinated from the Amendment’s 
surrounding text. The right to assistance of counsel is not free-standing. 
It concludes a series of independent entitlements to notice, a speedy and 
public trial, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and compulsory 
process.289 Satisfaction of these rights requires action by a prosecutor, a 
court, or both. None can be realized solely through a criminal 
defendant’s independent exercise of will or purchase of private services 
in the marketplace.290 
Whence, then, the right to choose? The Gonzalez-Lopez majority 
openly admitted to having “formulated” it, while describing the right to 
choose as “the root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment right to 
                                                     
283. Id. at 148–52 (2006), aff’g 399 F.3d 924, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Holly, supra note 
169, at 186 n.28, 187–88 (discussing federal circuit court decisions applying structural error 
analysis in right-to-choose cases). 
284. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.  
285. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146–48, 149 n.4. 
286. Id. at 145–47. 
287. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
288. Assistance, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
american_english/assistance [https://perma.cc/GJT4-QNNP]. 
289. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
290. Cf. Paul Alessio Mezzina, Elevating Choice over Quality of Representation: United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 455–56, 461 (2006) 
(citing and distinguishing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 90 (1997), and noting that there is little argument that the “per se entitlement to 
appointed counsel . . . was not identified by the Court until some 150 years after the signing of the 
Constitution”). 
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assistance of counsel.291 The Court cited three cases and a history book 
to support this formulation.292 Two of the cases, Wheat and an 1898 
habeas case, Andersen v. Treat,293 actually rejected the defendants’ right-
to-choose claims294—beautifully illustrating the “peculiar sacredness” of 
right-to-counsel doctrine.295 
Moreover, deeper excavation of the right’s history reveals a complex 
tangle of root meanings. In the founding era, free-market choice 
commingled with overt denigration of the poor296 as well as with 
benevolence of some pro bono counsel and conscription of others to 
provide representation for indigent defendants.297 Indeed, founding-era 
egalitarianism encompassed long-standing practices of appointing 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants, as well as proposals to 
socialize all legal services and create a federal Advocate General to 
defend the people as zealously as the Attorney General would 
prosecute.298 
All that said, neither the Court’s cursory originalism nor the tangled 
root meanings of the right to counsel undermine the Court’s conclusion 
in Gonzalez-Lopez: the right to choose counsel is among those root 
meanings, and that violation of the right alters the “framework” of 
litigation.299 As the Luis plurality acknowledged, the right of counsel 
                                                     
291. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48, 147 n.3; cf. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. 
Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel was “originally 
understood to protect only the right to hire counsel of choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 1098 (“As 
understood in 1791, the Sixth Amendment protected a defendant’s right to retain an attorney he 
could afford.”). 
292. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48, 147 n.3 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
159 (1988), Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898), and 
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18–24, 27–33 (1955)). 
293. 172 U.S. 24 (1898). 
294. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164; Andersen, 172 U.S. at 30−31. 
295. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (rejecting defendant’s right-to-counsel claim 
while proclaiming the right’s “peculiar sacredness,” and citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 
370, 374−75 (1892)). 
296. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 14−20 (1996); ALEXANDER 
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
7−21, 49−50 (2000). 
297. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 & n.20 (1942); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 
Stat. 112, 118; BEANEY, supra note 292, at 16−21. 
298. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81 (1973) and CHARLES 
WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 130−31, 212−23 (1911). 
299. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006); cf. Luis v. United States, 
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was “originally understood to protect only the right to hire counsel of 
choice” (emphasis added)).  
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choice relates directly to “the necessarily close working relationship 
between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the critical 
importance of trust . . . .”300 Counsel choice often affects pretrial 
investigation, discovery, and plea counseling as well as theory 
development, jury selection, presentation of evidence, closing argument, 
and sentencing advocacy.301 Counsel choice also alters relationships 
between the defense and prosecutors, on one hand, and the defense and 
jurors, on the other.302 
The Gonzalez-Lopez Court concluded that such systemic effects of 
attorney choice make it “impossible to know” how events would have 
unfolded had there been no violation of the right to choose.303 Like the 
poet in the autumn wood, appellate judges can only highlight choice 
itself as making “all the difference.”304 Roads not taken lead to an 
“alternate universe” from which appellate judges are epistemologically 
and legally banned.305 Indeed, the right of attorney choice is considered 
so crucial that at least one jurisdiction subjects alleged violations to 
immediate appeal.306 
These procedural facts are remarkable. Criminal defendants rarely 
enjoy either the right of interlocutory appeal or the benefit of structural 
error review. Equally notable is the fact that Gonzalez-Lopez, like the 
defendants in Wheat, Caplin, and Luis, had ample means to hire counsel 
of choice. Indeed, Gonzalez-Lopez had not just one lawyer retained on 
his case, or two, but three.307 
Nevertheless, after defining the “root meaning” of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as choosing counsel, and after adding 
counsel choice to the tiny set of constitutional rights that are reversible 
for structural error, the majority added dicta that denied the same right to 
                                                     
300. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1089. 
301. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.  
302. Id. at 150–51. Notably, the Gonzalez-Lopez majority did not reiterate the grumpy statements 
in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983), that the Sixth Amendment does not entitle criminal 
defendants to a “meaningful relationship” with their attorneys. While the dissent did so, Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. at 154, the majority instead cited Slappy’s unremarkable holding that trial judges 
have discretion to consider scheduling matters when ruling on a defendant’s motion to continue. Id. 
at 152 (citing Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11–12); cf. Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 
1107 (2014). 
303. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150. 
304. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1916). 
305. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150. 
306. State v. Chambliss, 947 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio 2011) (concluding that Gonzalez-Lopez 
abrogated the holding of Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984), that such rulings are not 
immediately appealable). 
307. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142–43. 
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poor people.308 The four dissenters threw in with the majority on this 
point.309 No member of the Court disputed the statement that “the right 
to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel 
to be appointed for them.”310 
Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez continued the development of the Sixth 
Amendment’s root meaning into the right of the individual, autonomous 
consumer to purchase services in the marketplace. Yet the dictum 
barring indigent defendants from attorney choice was not based on the 
sparse briefing in the case. The parties’ written submissions were silent 
on the subject, with one exception. A single line at the end of the 
government’s reply brief noted the “anomaly” of granting “defendants 
with means” the right to choose while denying the same right to the 
poor.311 
The “no-choice” dictum in Gonzalez-Lopez was similarly 
unsupported by any meaningful exchange during oral argument. When 
the Chief Justice was told that indigents do not have the right to choose a 
lawyer, he asked, “Why not?”312 Justice Kennedy then indicated that the 
core justification proffered for the right to choose—the vindication of 
personal autonomy—would apply to indigents as well as defendants 
with means to hire counsel.313 
Gonzalez-Lopez’s lawyer responded that the government has no duty 
to provide individuals with the means to effectuate their rights, citing the 
failure to distribute printing presses under the First Amendment.314 He 
further argued that the right to choose is confined to “the [ten] percent, 
or whatever number” of defendants who can afford to hire counsel, and 
that class-based disparate enforcement is warranted by the interests of 
this “small . . . but . . . important universe of people” in exercising 
personal autonomy.315 
                                                     
308. Id. at 147–48. 
309. See id. at 152–62. 
310. Id. at 151 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). 
311. Reply Brief for the United States at 16, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006) (No. 05-352). 
312. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006) (No. 05-352). 
313. Id. at 30–32; cf. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1110 (2016) (Kennedy & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (questioning the majority’s “constitutional command to treat a defendant 
accused of committing a lucrative crime differently than a defendant who is indigent from the 
outset”). 
314. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) 
(No. 05-352). 
315. Id. at 35–36. 
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5. The Duty to Declare: Montejo v. Louisiana 
Gonzalez-Lopez’s vindication of personal autonomy and freedom of 
choice continues a theme from Faretta. Both of these cases reversed 
criminal convictions for structural error and did so out of similar 
“respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”316 The 
same constitutional interests in personal autonomy and freedom of 
choice played a prominent role in Wheat and Caplin. In those cases, 
dissenting justices emphasized that the majority opinions imposed 
restrictions on the right to choose counsel that improperly sacrificed 
personal autonomy in favor of government interests.317 The plurality 
opinion in Luis framed similar concerns in terms of the significance 
under the Sixth Amendment of “the necessarily close working 
relationship between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the 
critical importance of trust.”318 
Close analysis of Montejo v. Louisiana319 reveals a similar focus on 
core constitutional values of personal autonomy and choice. It is easy to 
miss this point and the strong support Montejo offers for an inclusive 
right of attorney choice that applies to all defendants. Indeed, Montejo 
echoes the “no-choice-for-the-poor” dicta from Gonzalez-Lopez.320 
Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling in Montejo turns on the indigent 
defendant’s capacity for exercising personal autonomy and choice with 
respect to appointment of counsel. Thus, the Court’s own choice-
championing reasoning again trumps discriminatory “no-choice” dicta. 
Montejo arose in Louisiana, where the defendant was charged with 
murder.321 Local rules required automatic appointment of counsel in 
such cases.322 As Montejo’s lawyer scrambled to meet his new client and 
discourage uncounseled communication about the case, law enforcement 
officers were already interrogating their suspect.323 They did so after 
                                                     
316. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–
51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
317. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 644–45 (1989) (Blackmun, 
Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165–66 (1988) 
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
318. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion). 
319. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).  
320. Id. at 784 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). Like all of 
the leading right-to-choose cases, Montejo involved a testy 5-4 division among the justices. Id. at 
779. 
321. Id. at 781–82. 
322. Id.  
323. Id. 
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obtaining Montejo’s waiver of his right to consult with counsel before 
and during the interrogation.324 The tactic paid off. The officers obtained 
incriminating information from Montejo, and the prosecutor used that 
evidence to win a capital murder conviction and death sentence.325 
Montejo argued that admission of his uncounseled statements at trial 
was reversible error.326 Many assumed that the issue was settled in 
Montejo’s favor more than twenty years earlier. Under Michigan v. 
Jackson,327 the prosecutor faced a rebuttable presumption that Montejo’s 
waiver of appointed counsel was invalid and the uncounseled statements 
were therefore inadmissible. Instead of ruling accordingly, the 5-4 
Montejo majority distinguished and then overruled Jackson.328 
The reasoning offered to support this ruling also supports the indigent 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. In distinguishing 
and overruling Jackson, the Montejo Court reasoned that, when Montejo 
was automatically appointed counsel, he did “nothing at all to express 
his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights” and therefore 
there was “[n]o reason . . . to assume that [he] . . . would not be perfectly 
amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel present.”329 
The Court concluded that such amenability promoted “truth-seeking” 
and outweighed the “marginal benefits” of Jackson’s heightened Sixth 
Amendment protections.330 
Montejo’s relevance to the right-to-choose issue should now be clear. 
The Court imposed a duty upon defendants to declare their interest in 
protected Sixth Amendment attorney-client relationships in order to 
vindicate those protected interests fully—even when those relationships 
are created automatically as a matter of law.331 The duty to declare and 
the correlative right to choose presume and promote the exercise of 
virtually identical capacities for personal autonomy and freedom of 
choice that permeate the Court’s right-to-choose reasoning. It therefore 
makes good sense to pair Montejo’s imposition of a heightened duty to 
understand and actively vindicate one’s own Sixth Amendment interests 
with an inclusive rule that grants all defendants constitutionally 
protected attorney choice. 
                                                     
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 782–83. 
327. 475 U.S. 625, 630, 633 (1986). 
328. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 799. 
329. Id. at 789 (emphasis in original). 
330. Id. at 793. 
331. Id. at 799. 
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B. Due Process, Equal Protection, and the “No-Choice” Rule 
The foregoing analysis of Supreme Court cases uncovered support for 
arguments favoring an inclusive right to attorney choice that the Court’s 
“no-choice” dicta had previously masked. First, a closer look at Faretta 
indicates that granting indigent defendants the right to choose counsel is 
at least as likely to promote finality in case outcomes as the current rule, 
which forces indigent defendants to choose between unwanted counsel 
and no counsel at all. Second, Slappy and Wheat reduce administrative 
problems by cabining counsel choice to lawyers who are qualified, 
available, and conflict-free. Third, questions from the bench during the 
Gonzalez-Lopez argument and the reasoning of the opinions in Luis 
highlight the equal autonomy and liberty interests of indigents and those 
with means to hire lawyers, at least with respect to choice of counsel. 
Finally, the same autonomy and liberty interests underscore Montejo’s 
“pro-choice” logic, which requires that indigents exercise agency and 
actively assert their views regarding appointed counsel even when local 
procedures render such assertions superfluous. 
These constitutionally relevant interests in the indigent defendant’s 
autonomy and freedom of choice implicate two additional, intertwined 
constitutional doctrines that support vindication of the right to choose 
counsel for indigents as well as for those with means to hire lawyers. 
Those doctrines are due process and equal protection. As the Court made 
clear decades ago, “[b]oth equal protection and due process emphasize 
the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before 
the bar of justice in every American court.’”332 
That concern for equal treatment and basic fairness may help to 
explain why the Supreme Court has never adopted the “no-choice-for-
the-poor” rule as a matter of law. As Professor Heather Gerken notes in 
a different context, “some opinions don’t write.”333 This subsection uses 
two syllogisms to explain why a Supreme Court “no-choice” ruling 
won’t write. The first syllogism establishes that the Sixth Amendment 
right to choose counsel is a fundamental right. The second establishes 
that wealth-based denial of this fundamental right violates due process 
and equal protection. 
                                                     
332. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (citation omitted); see also Tague, supra note 175; 
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1197, 1201 (2013). 
333. Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014). 
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First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.334 The Court has further defined the “root meaning” of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the right to choose an attorney.335 
Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel should be 
considered a fundamental right.336 
Second, the Court has subjected class-based, de jure discrimination 
that “might invade or restrain” fundamental rights to heightened review, 
reasoning that such discriminatory rules “must be closely scrutinized and 
carefully confined.”337 In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance 
of such close scrutiny when “[l]ines [are] drawn on the basis of wealth 
or property, [which] like those of race . . . are traditionally 
disfavored.”338 Applying that reasoning, the “no-choice” rule should 
receive close scrutiny. A heavy justificatory burden should rest on those 
who would continue to exclude poor people from exercising a 
fundamental right that is protected for those with means to hire counsel. 
Indeed, a proponent of the “no-choice” rule would seem to have an 
insurmountable burden even under the lowest, rational-basis test. In key 
cases, the Court has struck down wealth-based rules that discriminate 
against criminal defendants. Those cases specifically reject wealth-based 
discrimination affecting the right to counsel, whether that right derives 
from the Sixth Amendment339 or is an unenumerated right arising from 
local rules of appellate procedure.340 
Moreover, under any level of scrutiny, the “no-choice” rule has been 
more reflexive than reasoned.341 For purposes of due process and equal 
protection analysis, a defendant’s indigency does not set him or her apart 
in any relevant way from defendants with means to hire attorneys. This 
is certainly true regarding the exercise of personal autonomy and choice 
that is protected by Faretta, Gonzalez-Lopez, and Luis, and that is 
required by Montejo to fully vindicate the right to counsel. It is also true 
                                                     
334. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 
(1938). 
335. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 n.3 (2006).  
336. See Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014); id. at 1107 (Roberts, 
C.J., and Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
337. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
338. Id. at 668. 
339. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). 
340. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354–58 (1963); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 609 
(2005); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (striking down fee for transcript on 
appeal).  
341. See supra section I.E. 
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regarding the exercise of collective wisdom and will that is nascent in an 
inclusive, democracy-enhancing right of counsel choice that is available 
to all defendants.342 
Thus, a Supreme Court “no-choice” opinion won’t write because the 
“no-choice” stance is the effective equivalent of the poll tax held 
unconstitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.343 In 
both settings, a wealth-based rule excludes indigents from exercising a 
right on the same terms as those with the means to purchase entry. Just 
as “wealth or fee paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications,”344 
such assets are irrelevant to exercising personal autonomy and choice, as 
well as collective wisdom and will, in the context of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Just as “the right to vote is too precious, 
too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned,”345 so, too, is the 
Sixth Amendment right to choose an attorney. 
III. DISCRIMINATION’S DIVISIVENESS: A NEW LOOK AT 
LOWER COURT CASES 
Part II revealed how the Supreme Court’s “no-choice” dicta mask 
justifications for an inclusive right to counsel choice that are contained 
in the same cases. In combination with equal protection and due process 
doctrines disfavoring de jure wealth-based discrimination against 
criminal defendants, this analysis helps to explain new tension and 
divisions among state courts and lower federal courts over the “no-
choice” rule. These new tensions and divisions open opportunities for 
reform through litigation and policy advocacy. 
A. Tension in Wisconsin: State v. Jones 
The case of Dwight Jones illustrates rising tension over the rule 
excluding indigent defendants from constitutionally-protected attorney 
choice. In the spring of 2005, Jones faced multiple charges arising from 
car thefts in a Milwaukee parking garage.346 Like the majority of 
criminal defendants,347 Jones had court-appointed counsel because he 
                                                     
342. See supra sections I.B–D. 
343. 383 U.S. at 670. 
344. Id. 
345. Id.  
346. State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Wis. 2010). 
347. See HARLOW, supra note 4. 
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could not afford to hire a lawyer.348 Unfortunately, Jones was unhappy 
with his appointed lawyer and repeatedly requested a different 
attorney.349 
Jones had an advantage over some indigent defendants because 
Wisconsin’s rules allow indigents some freedom to seek substitute 
defense counsel.350 Jones therefore asked for another lawyer, who was 
qualified and conflict-free, months before trial.351 The state conceded 
that this request was timely; thus, it did not appear that substitution of 
counsel would have impeded the progress of the case or the court’s 
schedule.352 
If Jones had been among the minority of criminal defendants able to 
hire a lawyer, his timely request for a qualified, available, conflict-free 
attorney would have met the requirements for exercising his Sixth 
Amendment right to choose an attorney.353 Denying the request would 
have been an abuse of discretion.354 Any subsequent conviction or 
sentence would have to be vacated automatically under the structural 
error standard of review.355 
Consequently, had Dwight Jones been able to pay his chosen lawyer, 
he would have satisfied the criteria for winning a new trial under 
Gonzalez-Lopez regardless of the strength of the prosecution’s case 
against him. The Supreme Court issued Gonzalez-Lopez during the 
litigation of Jones’ case.356 He met the otherwise applicable criteria for 
exercising the Sixth Amendment right to choose (i.e., a timely request 
for a qualified, available, conflict-free lawyer). Nevertheless, because 
Jones required government-paid counsel, the trial judge required him to 
prove there was an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown of 
communication with his assigned lawyer that would prevent an adequate 
defense.357 Finding no such conflict or breakdown, the court denied the 
motion for new counsel.358 
                                                     
348. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 382. 
349. Id. at 383–85. 
350. Id. at 391–92 n.14 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE PD § 2.04 (2016)). 
351. Id. at 383. 
352. Id. at 390. 
353. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146–48 (2006) (unwarranted judicial 
interference with criminal defendant’s right to choose retained counsel is structural error). 
354. See id. at 148. 
355. Id. at 146–48. 
356. See id.; Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 382–83. 
357. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 390–91. 
358. Id. 
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Nor did the appellate courts vacate Jones’s subsequent convictions for 
structural error.359 Instead, he had to meet the far more onerous 
ineffective assistance test of Strickland v. Washington.360 That is, he had 
to prove that his lawyer engaged in unreasonable acts or omissions 
according to prevailing professional standards, as well as a reasonable 
probability that those failures altered the case outcome.361 
Three decades of case law and commentary document Strickland’s 
shortcomings.362 While this Article does not summarize that literature, it 
suffices to say that courts have found no reversible error due to the poor 
performance of sleeping lawyers,363 habitually drunken lawyers,364 and 
lawyers who (although awake and apparently sober) fail to investigate 
and present readily available evidence of actual innocence in capital 
murder cases.365 It was therefore unsurprising that Jones could not 
satisfy Strickland and, as a result, that his convictions were affirmed.366 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sixth 
Amendment’s “root meaning” was meaningless for Jones solely because 
he was too poor to hire a lawyer.367 To justify the outcome, the court 
invoked U.S. Supreme Court dicta that the poor have no right to choose 
an attorney.368 A concurring opinion of two justices, including 
Wisconsin’s then-Chief Justice, noted that such wealth-based 
discrimination in the vindication of a fundamental constitutional right 
raised equal protection concerns.369 
                                                     
359. Id. at 394–95. 
360. Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 664, 688 (1984))). 
361. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
362. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 50.  
363. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623−25 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1575 
(2012) (discussing “sleeping [lawyer]” cases). 
364. Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001) (affirming 
death sentence although “troubled” at capital defense attorney’s admitted “decades-long routine” of 
drinking “twelve ounces of rum” each night during trial); see also Ronald J. Tabak, Why an 
Independent Appointing Authority is Necessary to Choose Counsel for Indigent People in Capital 
Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1112−13 (2003). 
365. See, e.g., Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. Supp. 2d 706, 728–30 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per 
curiam, 467 F. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding trial counsel 
ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying defendant new trial). The author represented 
Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal appellate and post-conviction challenges to his 
convictions and death sentence. Scanlon, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
366. State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 394–95 (Wis. 2010). 
367. Id. at 393–94; id. at 398 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
368. Id. at 391. But see supra section II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “no-choice” 
statements are dicta).  
369. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 395–98 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
11 - Moore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  1:04 PM 
2016] THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT 1755 
 
That concern echoes those raised by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy.370 As discussed in section II.B, the Supreme Court has 
rejected schemes that discriminate against poor people in the exercise of 
fundamental constitutional rights related to court access and criminal 
process. However, instead of relying on that line of cases, the Jones 
concurrence proposed a different solution. The opinion suggested that 
courts should level down by applying the rigorous Strickland ineffective 
assistance test to rich and poor alike when the Sixth Amendment right to 
choose is at issue.371 
The Jones concurrence marks new tension over the constitutionality 
of the “no-choice” rule. Nevertheless, it does not appear that Jones’s 
lawyer sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court. To the contrary, her 
state court pleadings denied that Jones sought to choose a particular 
attorney under Gonzalez-Lopez.372 Instead, she argued, he merely sought 
to reject appointed counsel under Faretta v. California—albeit serially, 
as necessary to accomplish his goals.373 
That argument was not unreasonable. After all, the Faretta right to 
refuse trial counsel, although subject to vociferous criticism, is well-
established as a fundamental right.374 Moreover, as discussed in section 
II.A, the Supreme Court itself has mistakenly cited its own “no-choice” 
dicta as rulings.375 Finally, while the Court’s “no-choice” statements are 
dicta, they reflect the majority rule among lower courts.376 Any of these 
reasons might have informed the reframing of Jones’s right-to-choose 
claim as a serial right-to-reject claim. Nevertheless, closer examination 
of lower court cases shows that Jones embodies new tensions over the 
“no-choice” rule that are deepening into jurisdictional divides. 
                                                     
370. See supra notes 312−13 and accompanying text. 
371. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 398 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
372. Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 21–22, State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 
378 (Wis. 2010) (No. 2008AP002342-CR). 
373. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 1–3, State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378 (Wis. 
2010) (No. 2008AP002342-CR) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975)); see supra 
section II.A.1 (discussing the role of Faretta in the Supreme Court’s right-to-choose doctrine). 
374. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000). 
375. See supra section II.A. 
376. Holly, supra note 169, at 198–99. But see Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th 
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 161 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2005) (acknowledging but declining to apply majority 
rule of structural error review to right-to-choose claim raised on habeas). 
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B. Jurisdictional Divides 
Close study of the case law reveals jurisdictional divides over a 
specific application of the “no-choice” rule. The issue arises when 
defendants hire counsel, but for financial reasons eventually must 
proceed with government-paid lawyers. A few defendants have cited 
their Sixth Amendment right to choose in seeking to replace retained 
counsel with appointed counsel.377 When trial judges deny those 
requests, state appellate courts tend to apply the same abuse of discretion 
and structural error analyses that benefit defendants with means to hire 
counsel.378 
In contrast, the majority of the federal circuit courts reject such 
appeals, reasoning that the defendants are merely seeking public services 
and not exercising a federal constitutional right to hire counsel on the 
private market.379 Those rulings leave defendants in the same fix as any 
indigent trying to replace one public defender with another.380 They lack 
the Sixth Amendment right to choose that is enjoyed by those with 
means to retain counsel.381 They must meet the more onerous cause-and-
prejudice test applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jones. They 
do not benefit from the more generous abuse of discretion and structural 
error analyses enjoyed by those who can hire counsel. 
The following chart illustrates points of uniformity and division 
among jurisdictions. The chart categorizes the various rules that courts 
apply depending on whether the defendant seeks to hire a new lawyer 
(whether the prior lawyer was retained or appointed), to obtain 
                                                     
377. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 555–56 (Cal. 1990); People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 
113, 126–27 (Colo. App. 2009); People v. Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d 435, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); 
Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 1235–36 
(Utah Ct. App. 2009). 
378. See, e.g., Ortiz, 800 P.2d at 555–56; Munsey, 232 P.3d at 126–27; Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d at 
444; Owens, 865 P.2d 1250; Barber, 206 P.3d at 1235–36. 
379. See United States v. Hagen, 468 F. App’x 373, 385 (4th Cir. 2012). 
380. Id. at 383–84 (requiring defendant to show cause for substitution); United States v. Mota-
Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004). 
381. The typical three-part balancing test requires weighing the motion’s timeliness, the scope of 
the trial court’s inquiry into the reason for the motion, and the defendant’s showing of good cause 
for the substitution. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Fisher, J., concurring) (discussing Ninth Circuit standard); United States v. Van Anh, 523 F.3d 43, 
48 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying standard); United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130–31 (6th Cir. 
1990) (discussing same standard in other circuits); Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 
P.2d 1007, 1010 (Cal. 1973) (denying relief for indigent defendant who sought new public 
defender); State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 393–94 (Wis. 2010) (same). 
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appointed counsel as a replacement for retained counsel, or to substitute 
one appointed lawyer for another: 
 
Substitution 
Type Cause Required Structural Error 
 States Circuits States Circuits 
Retained - 
Retained       
Appointed - 
Retained       
Retained- 
Appointed       
Appointed - 
Appointed       
 
The top two rows show that courts routinely apply the most generous 
standard to the minority of defendants with means to hire counsel. Those 
defendants need not show cause for hiring a qualified, available, 
conflict-free lawyer to replace current counsel, regardless of whether the 
original attorney was retained or appointed. Denial of such motions is 
considered an abuse of discretion. Subsequent convictions are reversed 
automatically as structural error.382 
The bottom row shows that courts routinely hold poor people to the 
most demanding standard. The majority of defendants who cannot afford 
to hire counsel must show cause to substitute one appointed lawyer for 
another. Showing cause is a high hurdle for many litigants, requiring an 
irreconcilable conflict, total breakdown of communication, or 
comparable difficulty. Even if defendants can meet that test, they cannot 
reverse a subsequent conviction without proving that the wrongful denial 
of the substitution motion resulted in constitutionally ineffective 
assistance under Strickland.383 
The row marked with a bold outline illustrates the division between 
the states and federal courts in cases involving retained-to-appointed 
substitutions. State courts that have considered the issue apply the more 
generous abuse of discretion and structural error standards of review 
when trial judges refuse to allow defendants to substitute qualified, 
                                                     
382. See, e.g., Bradley v. Henry, 510 F.3d 1093, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2007), modified and rehearing 
denied, 518 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2008).  
383. See supra section III.A.  
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available, conflict-free appointed counsel for retained counsel.384 In 
contrast, federal courts have applied the more demanding cause-and-
prejudice test.385 
Still deeper analysis of the federal cases reveals new tension over the 
“no-choice” rule in the retained-to-appointed substitution context as 
well. Like the concurring justices in Dwight Jones’s Wisconsin Supreme 
Court decision, some federal judges are indicating concern (or at least 
bemusement) about the class-based discrimination embedded in the “no-
choice” rule.386 Panels from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits made initial 
steps toward leveling the constitutional playing field—steps that they 
promptly retracted.387 
In United States v. Mason,388 the defendant claimed that the trial court 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to choose by denying his motion to 
substitute a government-paid lawyer for his retained counsel before the 
sentencing proceedings.389 The defendant had run out of money 
litigating the case and felt that the hired attorney was skimping on his 
efforts in an attempt to cut his losses.390 
By a 2-1 vote, the appellate panel initially ruled for the defendant and 
ordered a new sentencing hearing under the Gonzalez-Lopez structural 
error standard.391 The majority found  
no basis in precedent or principle for extending the right [to 
choose] to defendants who seek to replace retained counsel with 
new retained counsel but not to financially eligible defendants 
who seek to replace retained counsel with court-appointed 
counsel.392 
Noting a circuit split on the issue, the panel aligned itself with the 
Ninth Circuit’s more forgiving standard.393 That alignment lasted about 
                                                     
384. See supra note 378. 
385. See supra note 379. 
386. See United States v. Mason, 668 F.3d 203, 214 (5th Cir. 2012), withdrawn and opinion 
substituted, 480 F. App’x 329 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979–
81 (9th Cir. 2010). 
387. Mason, 668 F.3d. 203, 214; Mason, 480 F. App’x 329; Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979–81. 
388. 668 F.3d at 214. 
389. Id. at 206. 
390. Id. at 207–08. 
391. Id. at 215–16. 
392. Id. at 215 n.8.  
393. Id. at 214–15 (citing United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979–81 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying a “qualified” right to choose in the retained-appointed substitution context); United States 
v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 45–47 (1st Cir. 2004) (reaching the opposite conclusion)). 
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six months.394 The Mason panel then retracted its constitutional holding, 
and by another 2-1 vote ordered the same relief based on the trial court’s 
violation of the defendant’s statutory right to appointed counsel.395 
The Ninth Circuit decision referenced in Mason made a similar move. 
Two judges on the panel cited a prior opinion as “unequivocally” 
holding that retained-to-appointed substitution motions “implicated the 
qualified right to choice of counsel[,]” but with the concurring judge 
demurring on that point, ultimately ordered relief on statutory 
grounds.396 
These new tensions over the “no-choice” rule reflect unease with the 
unconstitutional wealth-based discrimination that infects the doctrine. 
These tensions also open the “no-choice” rule to renewed challenges 
from reform advocates. To that end, Part IV offers some practical 
strategies for making attorney choice meaningful for all defendants. 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
The elevation of the Sixth Amendment right to choose an attorney 
into the structural error pantheon has drawn relatively little attention. 
The implications of that move for improving the meaning and 
enforceability of the right to counsel, and in turn for broader criminal 
justice reform, depend in part on whether the right to choose remains 
exclusively in the hands of the relatively few defendants who can afford 
to hire counsel. This Part discusses some practical problems and 
responsive strategies related to implementing an inclusive right of 
counsel choice for all defendants. 
In keeping with precedent defining and limiting the right to choose, 
an inclusive counsel-choice rule would mean that all defendants have the 
right to choose a lawyer who is qualified, available, and free from 
conflicts of interest. As discussed in Sections I.A and II.A, those court-
imposed restrictions on the right to choose answer major practical 
objections to an inclusive right to counsel choice that applies to all 
defendants. Those court-imposed restrictions do so in part by allowing 
judges to prioritize efficient resolution of cases and court dockets. No 
defendant has the right to choose a lawyer whom the court properly 
                                                     
394. See Mason, 480 F. App’x at 335. 
395. Id. 
396. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979–81 (citing Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d 1469 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). 
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deems to be unqualified, unavailable, or tainted by a conflict of 
interest.397 
Moreover, criminal legal systems have already operationalized 
processes for matching defendants with attorneys.398 An inclusive right 
of counsel choice simply puts that machinery into the hands of the 
people who have the strongest interest in securing quality representation. 
Those are the people who face criminal charges, a disproportionate 
number of whom are poor people and people of color. 
It also is important to note that, on the Richter scale of disruptions to 
indigent defense service systems, a Supreme Court decision 
constitutionalizing counsel choice for all defendants would be orders of 
magnitude below rulings that imposed unfunded mandates. Examples of 
such seismic shifts include Argersinger v. Hamlin,399 which requires 
state-supported representation for misdemeanor charges that could result 
in jail time,400 and Padilla v. Kentucky,401 which demands that already 
overloaded and overworked defenders counsel clients on the 
immigration consequences of convictions.402 
In addition, as discussed in Part I, an inclusive right to choose can 
force greater transparency and accountability from defender systems. 
Currently, a significant information deficit regarding attorney 
performance in the United States undermines capacities for informed 
choice of counsel.403 It is unclear whether this information deficit is 
more or less significant in the civil or the criminal setting, or whether in 
the criminal setting there are different types and levels of information 
available regarding public defenders versus private defense counsel. It is 
clear, however, that the information deficit extends beyond clients 
seeking service. 
                                                     
397. See supra sections I.A and II.A. 
398. Lefstein, supra note 90, at 873; see also Schulhofer, supra note 91, at 547. 
399. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
400. Id.; see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/ 
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20808 [https://perma.cc/5ZG3-WWEF] (discussing system 
overload); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012) (same). 
401. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
402. Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; see also Andres Benach, Sejal Zota & Maria Navarro, How Much to 
Advise: What Are the Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, American Bar Association Section on 
Litigation Annual Conference (May 24–26 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac2013/sac_2013/18_world_after_padilla_v_kentucky.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV89-6VUE] (discussing practitioner “panic” over concerns 
that “advising on immigration consequences will be an overwhelming burden in an already complex 
job”).  
403. See supra section I.D.1. 
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For example, a recent U.S. Department of Justice survey revealed that 
more than forty percent of responding public defenders admitted their 
lack of even moderate familiarity with the American Bar Association’s 
Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System,404 which has been 
cited as an “essential guidepost” for evaluating system effectiveness.405 
In addition, for most jurisdictions, data on the existence and enforcement 
of standards for attorney qualifications, training, workload, and 
performance are difficult to obtain.406 The information deficit includes 
data on the resources necessary to fulfill counsel’s basic duties to 
communicate, investigate, and litigate.407 In addition, client-rights 
information protocols are rare, and solicitation of client feedback is 
almost nonexistent.408 
It also must be conceded that even the British indigent defense 
system, which Dean Lefstein cites as a successful attorney-choice 
regime,409 has been rocked by debates over a lack of transparency and 
accountability, generally poor service quality, and inattentiveness to the 
client’s perspective on those issues.410 As a result, and over considerable 
resistance, a detailed peer-review protocol was introduced while 
contracts for service were increasingly channeled toward government-
paid attorneys competing with private solo practitioners and small 
firms.411 The Ministry of Justice even proposed eliminating attorney 
choice for indigent defendants as barristers staged protests against fee 
cuts and increased regulation.412 
A robust right of counsel choice for indigent defendants also has 
implications for the internal culture of public defense systems.413 Culture 
                                                     
404. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ET AL., Survey: Adherence of 
Public Defense Providers to ABA Ten Principles (Sept. 2014), http://www.american.edu/ 
spa/jpo/gideon/upload/Gideon-Issues-Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE6R-AKC6]. 
405. Holder, Keynote Address, supra note 94. 
406. See supra section I.D.1. 
407. See supra section I.D.1. 
408. Supra section I.D.1.; see also Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 751–54 (discussing limited 
research on client perceptions). 
409. Lefstein, supra note 90, at 861, 893–900. 
410. National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The Procurement of 
Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales by the Legal Services Commission 6–9 (Nov. 27, 2009). 
411. See QASA: Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates: Criminal Advocacy Evaluation Form 
and QASA FAQs (on file with the author). 
412. Owen Bowcott, Criminal Barristers Announce Half-Day Refusal to Work in Legal Aid 
Protest, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/03/criminal-
barristers-action-legal-aid-cuts?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487[https://perma.cc/LW9M-R423]. 
413. I thank Eve Brensike Primus for raising this concern. 
11 - Moore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  1:04 PM 
1762 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1705 
 
change in this context is notoriously difficult.414 Lawyers and offices 
may resist demands for increased transparency and accountability that 
accompany an expanded right to choose counsel. On the other hand, 
expanded choice in many settings will often merely highlight 
information about attorney performance, or perceptions of attorney 
performance, that is already embedded in local culture and 
consciousness. Thus, much will turn on whether lawyers and managers 
use that increased transparency to demean and denigrate one another or 
to encourage improved performance through strength-based evaluation 
and training programs.415 
All of these problems indicate that inclusive choice, standing alone, is 
no panacea for the structural ills that beset indigent defense systems. The 
counsel-choice experiment in Comal County, Texas,416 illustrates a key 
aspect of the problem. Attorney reimbursements for felony guilty pleas 
are fee-capped at $650 in that county.417 This is so despite the state’s 
own workload study, which showed that completing the necessary tasks 
before entering guilty pleas in high-level felony cases should take 
between nineteen and twenty-six hours.418 
Thus, lawyers who participate in the Comal counsel-choice program 
can anticipate reimbursement rates ranging from $19 to $34 per hour. 
Those rates are among the lowest in the nation,419 and could not even 
cover “the basic costs of keeping a law practice open in Mississippi in 
1990.”420 Absent significant supplementation through judicial discretion, 
conscription, or voluntarism, such fee rates are unlikely to support a 
                                                     
414. See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 1769 (2016); Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the 
Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and 
Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 163–64 (2009). 
415. See Rapping, supra note 414, at 173–80. 
416. See Schulhofer, supra note 91. 
417. The Hon. R. Bruce Boyer et al., Order Adopting Local Rules for Appointment of Counsel in 
Criminal Cases and Schedule of Fees for Payment of Compensation to Appointed Counsel (Oct. 22, 
2013), http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlanDocuments/Comal/Comal%20District%20Court%20Attorney% 
20Fee%20Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TDS-J6AZ].  
418. Dottie Carmichael et al., Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads: A Report to the Texas 
Indigent Defense Commission, TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, App. I-1 (2015), 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYQ6-
A7PL]. 
419. John P. Gross, Gideon at 50: A Three-Part Examination of Indigent Defense in America, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS 12–14 (2013), https://www.nacdl.org/gideonat50/ 
[https://perma.cc/EV5G-V9J9]. 
420. SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., Justice Shortchanged: Assigned Counsel Compensation in 
Wisconsin 2 (2015), http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/6AC_wijusticeshort 
changed_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NYF-MCXH]. 
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counsel-choice program that has both consistently high service quality 
and long-term viability. 
Responding in detail to such problems is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Indeed, the argument presented in this Article assumes that 
significant increases in support for indigent defense are improbable. 
Nevertheless, some innovative strategies are available that can help 
promote informed, meaningful attorney choice for all defendants. By 
integrating broad attorney choice with data collection and grassroots 
organizing in a participatory defense model, these strategies are further 
examples of a democracy-enhancing theory in action. 
To that end, a model system for inclusive, meaningful attorney choice 
should meet three criteria. First, choice should be informed by relevant 
data on jurisdictional compliance with best-practice standards for 
indigent defense system structure and attorney qualification, training, 
performance, and workloads. Second, attorney choice should include all 
qualified lawyers. Every attorney should have a duty to accept cases for 
which she is qualified, pursuant to best-practice standards, without 
regard to client income, in some measure that is related to the percentage 
of practice devoted to criminal defense, unless and until attorney 
workload and investigative resources reach limits established by best-
practice standards.421 Third, judges should follow the lead of the 
Missouri and Florida court systems by working toward dismissal of 
cases that exceed workload and resource limits, in reverse-triage order 
beginning with minor misdemeanors.422 
The latter two criteria are likely to spark controversy. Comprehensive 
discussion of possible objections is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Before turning to the less controversial matter of improved data access, 
however, it is important to note that conscripting qualified private 
counsel does more than reinvigorate a constitutional root meaning,423 
and reverse triage does more than clear dockets. 
To be sure, some lawyers who are qualified to handle particular cases 
will respond to conscription by exiting the field or reducing quality of 
service. On the other hand, pressing more qualified private lawyers into 
                                                     
421. For citations to comparable scholarly arguments and proposed alternatives, see, e.g., Judith 
L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse 
Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 92–93 n.2, 155–57 (2002).  
422. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1303–09 (discussing Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So. 
3d 261 (Fla. 2013) and Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012)); BORUCHOWITZ 
ET AL., supra note 400, at 7 (arguing that the “explosive growth” of misdemeanor cases results in 
underrepresented misdemeanants and high tax costs). 
423. See supra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (discussing Luis v. United States, 
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)). 
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indigent defense service will also motivate more attorneys to challenge 
resource deficits through policy advocacy and litigation.424 Indeed, such 
challenges are occurring across the country, including in Louisiana, 
whose fee-funded system is in a state of near-collapse.425 Where such 
challenges have met with success, defenders and their allies built rich 
factual records that document the degradation of the defense function 
into a mouthpiece for the prosecutor’s charging and plea decisions.426 
But these cases also raise a number of difficult questions. They 
require prosecutors, defenders, and trial judges to cooperate in 
winnowing the defense workload down to a manageable burden. How 
are these stakeholders to negotiate separation of powers doctrine and 
other concerns that affect charging, plea, and diversion decisions? How 
will speedy trial rights be protected? Will already-overextended lawyers 
be called upon to fill the breach?427 
These are serious questions. Their answers will be shaped through the 
continued effort of dedicated reform advocates. As argued elsewhere,428 
one effective strategy is for defenders to embrace their strongest allies in 
the struggle for high-quality services: informed, proactive clientele. 
Indigent defendants who fully understand their rights and lawyers’ 
corresponding duties are in a better position to support defense demands 
for the time and resources necessary to fulfill those duties. 
Optimal information protocols include client-rights information forms 
and feedback surveys.429 Recent empirical research in Hamilton County, 
Ohio points to the feasibility of both protocols.430 Indigent defendants 
can receive a concise statement of basic components of defense 
                                                     
424. See Simmons v. State Public Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 89 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting hard fee 
cap as unenforceable due to its “chilling effect” on the right to counsel); id. at 79–82 (discussing 
alternate theories sounding contractual equity, due process-takings doctrine, and separation of 
powers); cf. ABA CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.2(b) (3d ed.) (1992) (recommending “the active and substantial 
participation of the private bar[]” in all indigent defense systems); see also TEN PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 93 (“Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists of 
both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.”). 
425. Campbell Robertson, In Louisiana, the Poor Lack Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/us/in-louisiana-the-poor-lack-legal-defense.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/4QBR-5FCX]; David Carroll, Louisiana’s Right to Counsel Problems Explained, 
SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/louisianas-right-to-counsel-
problems-explained/ [https://perma.cc/WNM4-XR8G]. 
426. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
427. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1307–09. 
428. Id.; see also Campbell et al., supra note 119. 
429. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15. 
430. Campbell et al., supra note 119. 
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representation, such as communication and investigation, to which they 
have constitutional and regulatory rights.431 Client feedback surveys 
have documented the high priority defendants gave to their relationships 
and communication with attorneys.432 The same empirical evidence, 
including data from focus group interviews revealing the serious thought 
and consideration that indigent defendants give to these issues, tends to 
rebut paternalistic assumptions that poor people charged with crimes 
lack the same capacities for self-governance as those who have the 
means to hire counsel.433 
To exercise those capacities more fully, defendants can benefit from 
new strategies for data collection and assessment pioneered by the Texas 
Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC) and the North Carolina Systems 
Evaluation Project (NCSEP). TIDC is developing data dashboards that 
reveal, for example, local attorney caseloads and reimbursement rates.434 
NCSEP is one of the most advanced national efforts to define and 
implement key performance indicators for high-quality defense 
service.435 Examples include core duties to communicate and investigate. 
Implementation is underway in several pilot sites. Goals include 
increased transparency, accountability, and service quality.436 
Unfortunately, data have limited utility, at least with respect to 
sustainable system reform, absent a robust reform-oriented politics. 
Therefore, another important strategy for promoting meaningful choice 
of counsel for all defendants involves grassroots community organizing. 
A promising example is the participatory defense model pioneered by 
Silicon Valley DeBug, a small nonprofit in San Jose, California. The 
model trains defendants, their families, and their communities on the 
rights and duties embodied in the defendant-defender relationship.437 
Participants improve case outcomes by using that training to support 
counsel with case investigation and sentencing advocacy.438 Evidence of 
the model’s success include a recent celebration of more than 2,500 
                                                     
431. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15. 
432. Campbell et al., supra note 119. 
433. Id. 
434. See TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, Texas Indigent Defense Data, http://tidc.tamu.edu/ 
public.net/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9PL-PDTW]. 
435. See N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., The North Carolina Systems Evaluation Project, 
http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/SEP%20HomePage.html?c=Research%20
%20and%20%20Reports,%20Systems%20Evaluation%20Project [https://perma.cc/F4PE-67SU]. 
436. Id.  
437. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1281–91.  
438. Id. 
11 - Moore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  1:04 PM 
1766 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1705 
 
years transformed from potential time served to “time saved” for 
individual defendants through community involvement in their cases.439 
Participants also use the training to drive broader system change through 
classic organizing techniques such as public protest and policy 
advocacy. Examples of success include the provision of counsel 
previously unavailable at key process points such as misdemeanor 
arraignment.440 Thus, the participatory defense movement provides 
additional evidence to rebut paternalistic assumptions about the inability 
of poor people and people of color to exercise self-governance in the 
context of public defense services. 
To be sure, even augmented with these and other innovative 
strategies, an inclusive right to counsel choice is no cure-all for the 
myriad of complex, institutionalized, and interlocking factors that 
contribute to hyperincarceration and all its costs, which include the 
declining legitimacy of criminal legal systems. Nevertheless, these 
strategies do offer practical ways to promote meaningful attorney choice 
for all defendants. While an inclusive right to choose counsel can make 
no more than an incremental contribution to the struggle for criminal 
justice reform, it is a contribution worth making. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should include poor people in the Sixth 
Amendment right to choose counsel. Inclusive choice can force greater 
transparency and accountability from defenders and defense systems. 
More people exercising more informed choice should increase pressure 
to improve representation. Those improvements should trickle up to 
raise the Court’s abysmal constitutional standards for attorney 
performance. Better defense representation can also help to 
counterbalance the concentrated government power that transforms 
criminal legal systems into plea mills and debtor prisons. That 
recalibration may shore up diminishing cognate rights, such as rights to 
discovery and to jury trial. Thus, in the aggregate and over the long term, 
inclusive counsel choice can be a mode of grassroots lawmaking that 
reshapes the meaning of core constitutional guarantees and strengthens 
                                                     
439. Id. at 1287. The movement subsequently updated that number and celebrated 2,570 years of 
time saved. ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUSTICE PROJECT, 2,570 Years of Time Saved from 
Incarceration! (End of 2015 Total) (Dec. 29, 2015), http://acjusticeproject.org/2015/12/29/2570-
years-of-time-saved-from-incarceration-end-of-2015-total/ [https://perma.cc/M32V-UKZ8]. 
440.  Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1288.  
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system quality, fairness, and legitimacy to the point that the term 
“criminal justice” is neither oxymoronic nor utopian. 
 
